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By Morten Balling
Chairman of the SUERF Editorial Board,
Emeritus Professor of Finance,
Aarhus School of Business
On May 4–5, 2006 SUERF and the Central Bank of Malta jointly organized
a seminar “The Adoption of the Euro in the New Member States: Challenges
and Vulnerabilities on the Last Stretch.” This SUERF Study contains three
important contributions to the Malta Seminar
Michael C. Bonello, Governor, Central Bank of Malta, presents in his keynote
speech an overview of benefits and costs of euro adoption in the New
Member States. He explains the importance of fiscal consolidation aiming at
reducing deficit and debt levels to at least comply with the Maastricht criteria.
The mandatory period in which a country participates in ERM II is perceived
as a testing period, and in the current global environment it is really
a challenge for the New Member States to satisfy the convergence criteria.
The Governor concludes by stressing that in the examination that follows
a country’s request for a convergence report due consideration should be
given to the policy consistency and credibility of the applicant country.
In the paper “The Economics of Offshore Financial Services and the Choice
of Tax, Currency, and Exchange-Rate Regimes,” George M. Von Furstenberg,
Indiana University, combines macroeconomic factors with the political
framework for business activity. His main point is that policy choices are
based on both. Concern for the development of international financial
business activity can influence exchange rate policy and the choice between
maintaining a separate national currency instead of an internationally well
known currency as the euro. The author compares exchange rate policy
choices in Denmark and Malta, in offshore financial centers in Europe and in
financial centers in East Asia. He concludes that in some jurisdictions,
concern for the business interests of the international financial services
industry may tip the balance towards choice of fixed exchange rate policy or
adoption of an internationally important currency like the euro or the dollar. 
5
5_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 5In the paper “Promoting Integration of European Retail Payment Systems:
Role of Competition, Cooperation and Regulation,” Kari Kemppainen and
Sinikka Salo, Bank of Finland stress the importance of creating a level playing
field for different providers of payment services in Europe.
A well-functioning and integrated payment system is a necessary condition
for the existence of a truly single market. According to the authors, the
political aim should therefore be to complete a Single Euro Payments Area.
The analysis is based on network economics. They conclude that authorities
must promote some form of coordination among the market participants.
Besides, authorities must monitor the market and ensure that anti-competitive
practices are avoided. 
Read together, the three papers illuminate some of the important challenges
from different perspectives that the New Member States must meet in their
policy choices before and to some extent after they have adopted the euro.    
Morten Balling
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CHALLENGES AND VULNERABILITIES
The topic chosen for the seminar is particularly appropriate at a time when the
ten NMS have just entered their third year of EU membership and are
increasingly focusing their attention on monetary union. In these introductory
comments I shall, therefore, attempt to highlight some key issues which must
be dealt with on the path towards the adoption of the euro.
As our policy makers have become acutely aware during the past two years,
this path is characterised by manifold challenges and vulnerabilities, not least
those associated with real convergence, fiscal consolidation and capital
account volatility. The orientation of economic policy in these areas will have
to focus strongly, at the level of both national authorities and European
institutions, on consistency, flexibility and credibility if we are to extract the
maximum gains for all out of this next step in European integration.
9
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In order to place this topic in its proper context it is first important to recall
that the adoption of the euro is expected to produce significant net benefits for
the NMS in the long run. A consistent body of literature points to the
likelihood of substantial output growth arising out of increased external trade
in countries forming currency unions. Recent studies suggest trade gains of
between 6% and 15% from the creation of the euro after five years of its
existence.
1 On the basis of these estimates, euro adoption could raise GDP by
at least 1% to 2% over 20 years in the NMS.
2 These gains arise from the
elimination of exchange rate volatility and risk, lower transaction costs,
increased competition and price transparency, all of which lead to trade
creation. Lower risk premia on borrowing costs and the stronger frameworks
for policy discipline prevailing within the euro area are other potential
sources of economic growth.
Such considerations will no doubt have played a part in the recent decision by
the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council to seek the advice of the
European Central Bank (ECB) in developing a blueprint for forming
a currency union and introducing a common currency by 2010. In a similar
context, the announcement last week that Iceland is considering joining the
euro is most significant. The country’s Prime Minister is reported to have
said, “It’s clear [that] it’s not easy to run a small economy and a small
currency in a big market”.
There will also, of course, be long-term costs arising from the adoption of the
euro associated with the loss of monetary and, particularly, exchange rate
policy autonomy. Studies based on the Optimum Currency Area (OCA)
criteria, however, suggest that NMS are not likely to suffer from a more
pronounced incidence of asymmetric shocks than the existing non-core euro
area members.
3 Moreover, the nature of shocks to which the economies of
these countries are generally subject do not necessarily require intervention
on the nominal exchange rate, provided that more efficient mechanisms for




2 Schadler et al. (2005)
3 Fidrmuc (2001), Boreiko (2002)
4 Schadler et al. (2005)
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Against this prospect of net long-term benefits, and indeed if the NMS are to
maximize the benefits of euro adoption, they will have to continue making
substantial reforms to their economic, financial and social systems. While
such changes are in themselves necessary to ensure a smooth adoption of the
euro, they will continue to be endogenously engendered once these countries
become members of the euro area. In the meantime, however, these reforms
are posing major challenges to a number of NMS and are exposing
vulnerabilities which, if not addressed, could threaten their successful
participation in the euro area.
In the course of this seminar first-hand accounts of such challenges, and of
the policy responses to deal with them, will no doubt reveal the rich diversity
of country situations within an enlarged EU. Some challenges, however, will
be common to most new NMS. One such is the need to catch up in terms of
per capita income levels with euro area countries. In several NMS this
catching-up process is taking place in good part due to the relatively low wage
levels and high rates of return on capital in these countries relative to euro
area economies. These characteristics of the real sector are creating
challenges from a nominal convergence viewpoint. Chief among them are the
issues of real exchange rate appreciation and the need to cope with large, and
potentially volatile capital inflows.
Rising real exchange rates in NMS in part reflect productivity growth in the
traded sectors giving rise to Balassa-Samuelson effects, as well as a growing
demand for non-traded goods and the effects of price deregulation. These
factors would lead to relatively high inflation rates unless countered by
nominal exchange rate appreciation, both of which could potentially hamper
the process of nominal convergence necessary to adopt the euro.
5 The broad
conclusion which emerges from a number of studies on this issue is that
Balassa-Samuelson effects on the real exchange rate in NMS are estimated to
be of the order of 1% to 2% per year.
6
With regard to capital inflows, these are usually perceived as a source of
economic growth, especially when they take the shape of foreign direct
11
5 Begg et al. (2003)
6 For example Cipriani (2000), Kovacs (2002) and Mihaljek and Klau (2003)
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speculative pressures on the exchange rate. This is indeed a factor that is
currently affecting some NMS, as capital inflows appear to be shifting from
FDI to portfolio flows of a more speculative nature, perhaps in part
a by-product of the increased competition for productive investment from
Asian countries. In the near future, capital outflows from NMS may also be
occasioned by the creation of second pillar pension systems.
Needless to say, net capital inflows are accompanied by current account
deficits, reflecting expansions in aggregate demand driven by investment
expenditure or lower savings prompted by an expected growth in income. In
the present scenario, pressures on the current account are being reinforced by
the steady upward trend in international oil prices. Markets often view wide
current account deficits as a sign of vulnerability, thereby fuelling volatility
in capital flows. So far, a number of NMS with a flexible currency
arrangement have managed such volatility through exchange rate flexibility,
a tool which might, however, be progressively lost in the run-up to the
adoption of the euro.
Developments in financial intermediation may also pose significant
challenges in this regard. Thus far there has been a tendency for credit to be
relatively low compared to economic activity in NMS, as banks, which are
largely foreign-owned in a number of these countries, have been generally
averse to advancing a significant amount of credit to enterprises, although
tending to step up lending to households.
7 This implies the possibility that
with a further internationalisation of the financial sector on account of the
introduction of the euro, there could be a more rapid credit expansion through
bank borrowing from abroad, with the attendant dangers of overheating and
the formation of asset price bubbles.
These considerations have important implications for the maintenance of
financial stability in the NMS. While the regulatory and supervisory
frameworks are generally recognised to be strong in these countries,
8 they will
have to withstand increasing stress over the next few years arising from the
growing internationalisation of financial markets and the complexity of the
global financial architecture, as well as from domestic macroeconomic
dynamics.
12 Immediate concerns and inherent vulnerabilities
7 Schadler et al. (2005)
8 Schadler et al. (2005)
5_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 12In the run-up to the adoption of the euro, most NMS will also continue to face
the challenge of maintaining acceptable fiscal positions. Current expenditures
in many of these countries are high relative to GDP, and in a number of them
demographic profiles are casting doubts on the medium-term sustainability of
public finance. This is a concern not only from the viewpoint of nominal
convergence in terms of the Maastricht criteria, but also from the perspective
of the need for flexibility in the area of fiscal policy in order to be able to
counter the effects of asymmetric shocks.
Immediate concerns and inherent vulnerabilities 13
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In this scenario, the successful adoption of the euro by the NMS requires
efforts on two fronts, namely the implementation of economic policies
designed to meet the Maastricht criteria on a sustainable basis, and the
mobilisation of strong support for euro adoption so as to endow the project
with the necessary credibility.
With regard to the former, a continued emphasis on fiscal consolidation, with
deficit and debt levels that would be even lower than the threshold values of
the Maastricht criteria, would seem to be called for. In addition, reforms
aimed at removing rigidities and expenditure trigger effects in social welfare
transfers would also be appropriate in some countries. The capacity of
economies to respond successfully to the challenge of euro adoption would be
further enhanced by a greater degree of price and wage flexibility. Generally
speaking, the NMS have a satisfactory track record on this count, at least
compared with the non-core euro area countries, but the extent to which the
existing flexibility is enough to enable a sufficiently rapid catching up process
in the context of an increasingly competitive global trading environment is
yet to be assessed.
An overriding consideration relates to the degree of vulnerability that an
economy might experience during its participation in ERM II. This is now
generally perceived as a testing period to be entered into once the economy is
deemed a credible candidate for euro area membership, but not to be
postponed to the extent of unduly retarding the adoption of the euro, with the
consequent negative effects on policy credibility. Indeed, the exposure to the
international markets which participation in ERM II implies requires NMS to
follow even more prudent policies, especially on the fiscal front, compared to
existing euro-area countries. This is needed to compensate for the
vulnerabilities, not least that arising from capital account openness, which the
NMS are facing. This aspect of ERM II appears not to be sufficiently
understood by advocates of delayed euro adoption in some of our countries.
These policy prerequisites for adopting the euro may, on the other hand,
complicate the mobilisation of strong popular support for the euro project.
The case for fiscal consolidation may be compelling from a long run growth
perspective, but the dividends of such a policy course may fail to materialise
in a sufficiently short time to generate the necessary support. Likewise, the
14
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prices, generating further scepticism among the social partners. And let us not
forget that it is these same partners that have to be relied on to deliver the
flexibility in the labour and product markets that is required for a successful
transition to the euro. An active and constructive social dialogue is, therefore,
necessary to support the process.
Given the considerable policy challenges inherent in the adoption of the euro,
the European Commission and the ECB have an important role to play in
providing the NMS with both practical and moral support for their efforts to
achieve this next step in European integration. Such support might not only
take the form of regular reports and consultations in order to reassure the
markets, but also an effort to minimise uncertainties about the application of
the criteria used to assess eligibility for euro adoption. In this regard, the
challenge would seem to be to strike a balance between, on the one hand,
ensuring transparency and a level playing field and, on the other, giving due
weight to the track record of economic policy and performance in the NMS,
as well as to the implications for these countries, and indeed for the euro-area
as a whole, of an unduly rigid interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty.
Requisites for the successful adoption of the euro 15
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In making this point I am clearly not suggesting, as some academics have
done, that the Maastricht criteria are “neither necessary, nor sufficient”. On
the other hand, there are some aspects of the criteria that could legitimately
be the subject of reflection.
The calculation of the reference value of the inflation criterion is a case in
point. Over the past few years there has been a debate about how one should
define “best performance” in relation to inflation and also about the term
“outlier”. And even about why countries outside the euro area should be
included among the best performing countries. This debate appears to have
resurfaced again during the preparatory phase of the current ECB
Convergence Report.
Another, and currently very topical aspect that also has ‘level playing field’
connotations is the impact of the ongoing spike in the international oil price.
The current reference value for the HICP inflation criterion is influenced by
countries whose energy needs are satisfied in varying degrees by non-oil
fuels. At the same time, of the NMS that would not have satisfied the inflation
criterion on the basis of the March 2006 data, some are more heavily
dependent on oil imports, so that price levels generally in these countries have
been reflecting the higher cost of oil and energy to a much greater degree than
is the case in the reference countries.
This argument could also apply to Malta in the future since not only is oil the
sole source of electricity generation, but a high proportion of drinking water
needs are also met by the transformation of sea water, a process that involves
a high consumption of electricity.
The difficulty of controlling inflation in current circumstances is indeed also
reflected in the fact that three of the present euro area members exceed the
inflation reference value by an average of 1 percentage point, and there is
evidence pointing towards a divergence in inflation rates between these
countries over the past five years.
9 Moreover, the NMS have registered rates
of inflation between 2002 and 2005 that were around one half those recorded
16
9 Busetti et al. (2006)
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degree of macroeconomic stabilisation taking place, at the same time that
progress continued to be registered in terms of real convergence. In fact, since
2000 real GDP growth in NMS was on average more than double that
registered in the euro area member countries. 
These considerations acquire greater significance when viewed in the context
of fiscal developments. On the basis of 2005 data, among the NMS
participating in ERM II only Malta failed to satisfy the relevant criterion, with
a fiscal deficit to GDPratio of 3.3%. Malta, however, expects to be within the
reference value by the end of this year. This represents a considerable fiscal
consolidation effort, especially when viewed in the context of an average ratio
of 6.7% during the first five years of this decade. This progress is expected to
prove durable, as it has been based not only on tax measures, but also on the
restructuring of public sector entities, spending cuts and efficiency
improvements. Challenges to fiscal sustainability in NMS remain,
nevertheless, mainly arising out of the future dynamics of the welfare system
combined with population ageing, but these are hardly different from those
being faced by euro area members. 
It is furthermore interesting to note that on average the NMS participating in
ERM II recorded lower deficit to GDP ratios compared to the present euro
area member countries in 2005, among whom five posted deficits in excess of
3%. The positive fiscal performance of these NMS is further underscored,
with some individual exceptions, by their lower levels of public debt, which
as a percentage of GDP average around one half of those of the current euro
area member countries.
With regard to nominal exchange rates, it is a matter of some satisfaction that
none of the NMS participating in ERM II have experienced undue volatility
since their entry into the Mechanism. This to a large extent confirms the
appropriateness to date of the chosen central parity rates. It is also a reflection
of positive market sentiment.
The long-term interest rate is another important indicator of the suitability of
economies to participate in ERM II and eventually adopt the euro, as it
reflects the judgement of the financial markets regarding the credibility of this
process. All the NMS that are in ERM II currently satisfy this criterion,
having achieved a consistent track record of downward trends in long-term
interest rates over the past five years.
The application of the Maastricht criteria 17
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In conclusion, I think it is important in this case to look to the future with an
eye on the recent past, and recognize that the ten NMS have come a long way
in honouring their commitments to achieve the established macroeconomic
targets and implement significant structural reforms, often against heavy
odds. The magnitude of this undertaking must indeed be viewed not only in
terms of the difficulty of the task itself, and the economic and social costs
involved, but also against the background of an unfavourable global
environment. At the same time they have striven hard to narrow the gap in
living standards between themselves and the euro area member countries.
It is, therefore, important that in the examination that follows a country’s
request for a convergence report due consideration be given to the policy
consistency and credibility of the applicant country. A comprehensive
economic analysis that is not only quantitative but also qualitative, and which
recognizes the difficultly of simultaneously satisfying all the Maastricht
criteria in the current world environment would encourage EMU candidate
countries to persist in their efforts to achieve even closer nominal and real
convergence. It would also provide further evidence that the euro project is
credible, that it is both feasible and realizable in a near-term perspective.
18
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“[U.S.] Treasury officials contend that China has indeed moved toward
modernization of its financial system, and they say that the United States’
broader interest is in opening the Chinese market to American financial
services [than citing it as currency manipulator].”
New York Times, May 10, 2006, p. C11.
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10 Earlier drafts have benefited from comments by Governors Michael C. Bonello (Central
Bank of Malta) and Jens Thomsen (Danmarks Nationalbank), and by Morten Balling (Aarhus
School of Business) and Bernhard Speyer (Deutsche Bank), at the May 4-5, 2006 SUERF Seminar
and in subsequent correspondence. Haizhou Huang, Barclays Capital Asia Ltd., and Michael
Xuereb, Malta FSA, also provided exceedingly helpful information and comments as did
discussants at the APF biennial conference at the University of Waterloo, Canada, at which this
paper was presented on June 16, 2006 prior to final revisions. Responsibility for remaining errors
is the author’s alone.
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Open-economy macroeconomists regularly invoke the policy trilemma that
states that governments cannot simultaneously maintain an open capital
account, a fixed exchange rate, and a domestically-oriented monetary policy.
My thesis is that jurisdictions with substantial offshore activities find these
and other macroeconomic choices significantly affected by something else:
Concern for the continued health and development of their international
financial business. Monetary, exchange-rate, and tax policies and the choice
of domestic currency all will be impacted by this concern. The different
choices made by (1) Denmark and Malta in ERM II, (2) offshore financial
centers in Europe, and (3) financial centers in East Asia are considered to
develop some general conclusions.
24
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Open-economy macroeconomists, as in Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), tend to
dwell on the “impossible trinity” that states that governments cannot
simultaneously maintain (1) an open capital account, (2) a fixed exchange
rate, and (3) a domestically oriented monetary policy for any substantial
length of time. Others have suggested that, in Latin America at least, only one
of these three properties is sustainable, not two. Hausmann (2000) et al., for
instance, explain why a justified fear of floating and of financial turmoil
keeps flexible exchange-rate regimes from enjoying the luxury of a monetary
policy that is dedicated to domestic objectives. They conclude that with an
open capital account, floating is not nearly enough to buy independence for
monetary policy. Conversely, Fischer (2001, p. 22) argues that among
countries with open capital account, soft pegs remain crisis-prone and brittle,
even if policy orientation (3) is sacrificed. Giving up an independent
monetary policy may not buy pegs that are secure in the absence of capital
controls. Thus, the number of sustainable pairs in the trinity of (1) to (3) could
end up being zero in a number of developing countries, destroying what is
meant by a trilemma.
This paper takes off from this shared terrain, but in a different direction. As
hinted in the opening quote, it explores the extent to which macroeconomic
choices are influenced by considering what is best for the growth of
international financial business:
● Countries or jurisdictions with significant international financial service
centers obviously need open capital accounts at least for their offshore
financial business.
● They need to conduct most of that business in an important international
currency. But areas using such a currency either directly or as external
anchor necessarily have fixed nominal exchange rates with other countries
in the same block.
● Finally, they do not care much for a domestically-oriented monetary policy
– even if feasible – lest it get in the way of their external financial
business.
Not so long ago, new classical economics and real-business-cycle economists
routinely postulated that the choice of currency and exchange-rate regime can
not rationally be relevant to the market-clearing levels of the fundamental
25
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determine economic performance. Their “irrelevance” propositions have long
since goaded New Keynesian and other economists into demonstrating the
importance of “nominal” arrangements for “real” outcomes.
11 For instance, in
emphasizing the importance for macroeconomic stability of the choice of
currency area and exchange-rate regime, Buiter (1999) emphasized that
random noise that buffets nominal variables such as asset prices and
foreign-exchange values can cause volatility in real variables, and not just the
other way around. When Rose (2004), after an exhaustive meta-analysis of
19 studies, concluded that the mass of the evidence is “consistent with the
hypothesis that currency union approximately doubles trade” (p. 107), he was
confirming another strong causal link from “nominal” regime choices to
“real” effects. H M Treasury (2003) experts’conjectures about what adoption
of the euro might do to the stability and competitiveness of the UK economy,
and how it might affect inward FDI, all proceed from the premise that the
choice can have important consequences that need to be anticipated. The
more one gets down to the business of finance
12 – and considers the regulatory
and competitive frameworks shaping its scale and scope and its network
13 and
settlement capabilities – the more the choices of currency, tax, and
exchange-rate regimes matter.
Three cases are considered to show how these choices are affected when more
weight is placed on international financial business in a country or its
jurisdictions:
(1)Certain factors may be responsible for the contrasting decisions made by
Denmark and Malta with regard to membership in the European Monetary
Union (EMU). Among these factors are differences in the weight given to
maintaining an operating environment most conducive to the growth of the
two countries’ international financial services business.
26 Introduction
11 Economists have also questioned whether nominal and real exchange rates are well
explained by fundamentals. For an update on what has become of the exchange rate disconnect
puzzle see Sarno (2005).
12 As is done in Chapter 4 of H M Treasury’s (2003) assessment.
13As explained at greater length in Honohan and Vittas (2002), the network metaphor suggests
the structured interconnectedness of economic relationships. The usefulness of this web of
relationships rises with the number of participants that add to the strength (liquidity, robustness)
and extent (diversity, coverage) of the network. Thus externalities due to economies of scale and
scope, built-in structural redundancy to prevent component (node) failure from posing systemic
risks, and complexity in producing or processing innovations and interventions are recurring
characteristics of many networks.
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regimes in the EU and elsewhere shows that rogue regimes can not get
very far. Rather, past the infant-industry stage, cooperation with the
governments of their nonresident clients and membership in regional
networks are essential for such centers. Otherwise they will have difficulty
to upgrade and deepen their value-added services. Yet such centers
legitimately seek to keep taxes largely off the financial services business
and both its resident suppliers and nonresident clients. They prefer to tax
other types of trade and consumption associated, for instance, with
tourism, and immobile assets such as real estate.
(3)East Asian international financial centers, such as Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Shanghai, have made different choices about whether to segregate
their international financial business from the local economy or to
integrate it with the local financial business. Internal capital controls, such
as those between domestic and offshore banking or between dealing in
convertible and inconvertible currencies, can enable, as well as impede,
international financial service business.
Introduction 27
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Denmark and Malta, ERM-II
The first case considered is meant to show that international financial
business may be at the heart of why even small open economies in the same
economic region, like Denmark and Malta, make different currency choices.
The Governor of the Central Bank of Malta (Bonello, 2006) has made it the
focus of Malta’s monetary policy to maintain the peg to the Euro at the central
parity (of 0.429300 MTL/EUR or Lm/€) with only a small bid-ask spread.
The Central Bank therefore uses its tools, including the central intervention
rate, to achieve this objective. In practice this means that it copies movements
in the European Central Bank’s minimum bid rate on main refinancing
operations except when market forces indicate that the risk spread required by
holders of Maltese lira assets needs adjusting. This spread against euro was
about 75 basis points in the spring of 2006. Governor Bonello (2006, p. 4,
online) explains why subordinating monetary policy to the exchange-rate
objective may not be enough to guarantee stability, and that giving up having
a separate national money may be preferable:
For a small, open economy like ours with no trade or capital
controls, keeping a separate currency leaves us exposed to
external shocks and volatile capital flows. ... This vulnerability
is indeed the main reason why some leading academics
14 in this
field believe that the small new Member States should have been
allowed to lock themselves into the relatively greater security of
the euro area as quickly as possible.
Denmark’s krone, DKK, is pegged tightly to the euro at 7.46038 DKK/EUR,
more tightly than the 2.25% “Smithsonian” margins formally adopted would
suggest. Since 1999, the monthly average of this exchange rate has never
deviated by more than 0.5 percent from the central rate on the strong side, and
by even less on the weak side. Once again the distribution of responsibility
for economic policy is clear: “The central element of Danmarks
Nationalbank’s monetary policy is Denmark’s fixed exchange-rate policy
28
14 One of those the Governor may have had in mind is Willem Buiter, who, writing with
Clemens Grafe, concluded that “from an economic point of view, EMU membership should be as
early as possible, preferably at the same time as EU membership.” Buiter and Grafe (2002, p. 1).
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15 “The government then
conducts its fiscal and economic policy in general so as to achieve stable
economic development and in accordance with a fixed exchange rate.” This
means that fiscal policy experiments that would upset the exchange markets
are to be avoided. As a result, “when the foreign-exchange market is calm,”
the Nationalbank adjusts its interest rates in step with the ECB’s
adjustments.
16 Non-sterilized intervention that would drive a wedge between
the ECB’s and the Nationalbank’s interest rates could be expected only in
response to exchange-market turbulence (Abildgren, 2006, p. 80).
Until 2005, the 10-year euro-denominated Danish government debt tended to
yield 5 to 10 basis points more than 10-year (German) “bunds.”
DKK-denominated debt tended to be a little more expensive still, with the
yield spread over 10-year bunds averaging about 20 basis points in 2003 and
2004. Then in 2005, the spread on these local-currency issues relative to
bunds shrank essentially to zero, as it did also for Ireland and Spain. Indeed,
in 2005, on account of Denmark’s superior economic growth and fiscal
rectitude, its country risk premium against Germany may have become
sufficiently negative to compensate for any illiquidity premium still afflicting
DKK-denominated, compared with euro-denominated, issues.
The facts that the Danish government issues or refinances (now that Denmark
is running a fiscal surplus) some of its debt in euro and swaps some more
from DKK into euro may indicate that a country’s biggest financial business
is best not all conducted in its minor currency.
17 Current law allows Danish
companies to keep their books in euro, and most of the larger ones have
chosen to do so. As a harbinger of things to come in neighboring countries
outside the euro area, the Stockholm stock exchange already quotes and
transacts in both the local currency and in euro. Driven by a variety of
network effects, the euro is taking on some of the characteristics of a parallel
finance and business-invoice currency even in Denmark.
18 However, as in
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15 See http://www.nationalbanken.dk/DNUK/Euro.nsf/side/Denmark_and_the_euro.
16 See the “Introduction to monetary and foreign-exchange policy” on the Nationalbank’s web
site.
17 During the period 2002-2005, a steady 11 percent of Denmark’s total government debt
consisted of foreign currency issues, and, by 2005, the euro share of the latter had risen to
82 percent (von Hagen, 2006, p. 21). However, DKK debt that is swapped into euro debt is not
considered in this breakdown.  
18 Although not covering Denmark, Levy Yeyati (2006, pp. 103-108) is perhaps the first to
have addressed the issue of whether the effects of euroization are more benign than those of
dollarization.
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has been small.
Malta has some monetary-outlier characteristics. Among the 102 countries
with financial systems (M2) of less than $10 billion and information on GDP
in 1999, Malta had by far the highest ratio of M2 to GDP: 5261/3280 with
amounts in millions of U.S. dollars (Bossone, Honohan and Long, 2002,
p. 98). This ratio is still sometimes, though increasingly misleadingly, used as
a primitive measure of financial depth. An ECB (2003, p. 47) graphic for
14 mostly Central and Eastern European countries plus Turkey and Israel
shows that Malta was the only one that experienced a net reduction in
euro-denominated bank deposits from December 2000 to September 2002. In
spite of Malta’s clear prospect of joining the EMU at the start of 2008, the
level of Maltese liri in circulation since has remained amazingly high. The
amount of currency in circulation of over Lm500 million early in 2006
translates into Lm1,250 per Maltese, or around €2,900 per head.
Precautionary savings that are popularly salted away in the form of currency
and a flourishing off-the-books economy, not unique to Malta, are partly
responsible. The comparable figure for the euro area as a whole is only about
€1,800. Denmark’s own notes and coins outstanding in early 2006, of around
DKK55 billion or €7.4 billion, translate into less than €1,400 per capita (for
the earlier history see Danmarks Nationalbank, 2003, p. 53). Among EU
member countries, Denmark, like Finland (see ECB, 2003, p. 40), has long
had the lowest demand for currency in relation to GDP or private
consumption as reliance on electronic means of payment has much advanced. 
So, at this time, Malta would get more than twice as many euros per capita
for cancelling its own currency than Denmark could obtain, and this could
result in a major windfall for Malta. The argument is as follows: If the
demand for national currency falls to normal levels in a country in the process
of domestic financial development, the issuing central bank simply must buy
back and cancel the excess and conduct contractive open-market operations
as needed to prevent the reduction in the demand for currency from having
unwelcome inflationary effects. National currency thus is a form of private
wealth that contracts as less of it is demanded in the aggregate and seignorage
profit falls. By contrast, if the demand for euro-currency falls to more normal
levels in Malta after the conversion, Malta will use any excess euro-currency
to finance imports of goods and services or the acquisition of foreign
investment assets or to repay international debt. Because changes in
euro-currency demand in Malta carry only a minute weight for the euro area
as a whole, there will be no appreciable offsetting monetary policy effects.
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system as a whole will be borne almost entirely by EMU members other than
Malta. Hence the more euros Malta can get for free in the conversion from lira
to euro without thereby overvaluing its currency, the better off it will be.
This also means that currency forms of euroization prior to a planned formal
adoption of the euro through monetary union should be discouraged. By
detracting from the amount of Malta’s own currency that remains outstanding,
informal euroization prior to joining EMU would diminish its free terminal
conversion-to-euro take. Absent special transitional arrangements such as
those made for Germany on account of the wide extraterritorial use that had
been made of its currency (DEM), the distribution key for the annual flow of
seignorage after joining EMU is given by countries’ capital shares in the
ECB. These are based half on population and half on GDP shares of EMU
members.
19 Hence unilateral euroization detracts from a country’s flow
seignorage from its own currency prior to joining EMU, and then from the
free conversion take upon formal introduction of the euro, but not from the
subsequent pass-through of flow seignorage on euro to EMU members.
The strength of incentives to substitute an international for a local currency
depends on prevailing, and expected future, choices of currency and exchange
rate regimes, and on expectations about how soon the local currency will be
surrendered and at what final conversion rate. In open capital markets,
currency substitution provides monetary discipline as risk premiums, and
hence interests rates, are driven up whenever confidence in the domestic
currency and its exchange value decline. If there is a clear prospect of
monetary union, the dynamic may be different. For instance, the choice of
currency denomination may be influenced by the prospect that any currency
mismatches associated with current borrowing in euro, such as liability
euroization in balance sheets, will be resolved through the impending
accession to EMU. Genberg (2004) has discussed the effects of such
forward-looking expectations also on business- and labor-contracts’ chosen
currency of denomination, and on other means of direct hedging against
a prospective currency switch. These ways and means may impose insurance
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19 This distribution key clearly favors poorer countries if their currency holdings in percent of
GDP are no larger than those of richer countries. However, in Malta this percentage has been over
25 percent in recent years, making it three to four times as high as on EMU average, and at least
7 times as high as in Denmark, where this percentage has been in the 3.0-3.5 percent range since
2002. Possible implications of this unusual situation for changes in the flow of seignorage during
a period of adjustment after joining EMU are explored in an interview with Governor Bonello in
The Times (2006).
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pre-announced end and without firm agreement on the level of the final
conversion rate for entry into EMU.
Danish referendum voters do not yet feel exposed to such costs, with
a majority preferring to let the krone linger in ERM II indefinitely. There also
appears to be little public concern that, if Denmark ever fell into a political or
economic crisis, the krone’s ability to mimic the euro and its interest rates
would be undercut. Malta is more concerned about its vulnerability in this
regard (see Bonello, 2006, p. 4). Tiny open economies, such as Malta, are
least diversified by lines of business and by the number of producers and
institutions, each of which is subject to external shocks and to its own
internal-management, credit and operational risks.
20 Because of this extra
exposure and because international financial services are relatively more
important to Malta’s economy than to that of Denmark, Malta has decided to
head straight from EU membership toward the euro. Malta thus will seek
negotiated and secure integration with this international currency and its
networks. In this way concern about securing the continued growth of
providers of international financial services in a particular jurisdiction may
become connected with the decision formally to adopt the euro, rather than to
wait and see for the euro to get adopted informally through market forces
down the road.
Summary of Case 1. Denmark and Malta are both hard fixers to the euro in
ERM-II, but this state is indefinite for Denmark while leading almost
certainly to EMU membership for Malta in 2008. The difference in policy is
attributable to the facts that Denmark lives so much less off the international
financial services business and is far less fearful of confidence shocks and
speculative attacks on its currency than Malta. Hence while the plentiful liri
are going to be cashed in quickly for euros at the ECB before
Malta’s extraordinarily high demand for its currency falls, Denmark will try
to hold on to its krone even though its usefulness as accounting unit and
efficient vehicle for financial services could gradually decline. Denmark can
afford to take its time, but Malta may be wise to hurry and take cover through
formal adoption of the euro.
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20 Various limitations to domestic institutional development and internal diversification and
independence of decision centers in small countries are masterfully exposited and explored,
together with other governance issues, in Herbertsson and Zoega (2006) for Iceland. This is
a country whose per capita GDP is about twice as high as Malta’s while its population, now over
300,000, is not very much smaller. 
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Legitimation in the EU
Having discussed the profit and loss aspects of the competition for seignorage
and the choice of currency denomination, I turn to commercial aspects of
offshore finance and how they interact with monetary and exchange
arrangements as the second case. This discussion first characterizes the
business model of international finance by what is done in the offshore
centers of Ireland and Luxembourg
21 before turning to East Asia in the next
section to delve into the competitive forces at work between major financial
centers.
In recent years, the OECD, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) housed at
the OECD, the Commission of the European Communities and the EU
supervisory networks,
22 the BIS as well as the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) housed at the BIS, in
cooperation with IOSCO and IAIS, and with the IMF, all have focused on
increasing the transparency of operations in offshore financial centers and on
broadening their cooperation in tax and law enforcement matters with other
33
21 In the terminology proposed by the IMF (2000, p. 9), Ireland and Luxembourg, like Hong
Kong and Singapore, would be classified as regional financial centers. However, the dividing line
is fluid as OFCs, as defined in that IMF report, “still range from centers which provide specialist
and skilled activities, attractive to major financial institutions, and more lightly regulated centers
that provide services that are almost entirely tax driven, and have very limited resources to support
financial intermediation.” If one defined OFCs just as centers where the bulk of financial activity
is offshore on both sides of the balance sheet and the majority of institutions involved are
controlled by nonresidents, Luxembourg and Ireland’s IFSCs would fit the definition.
In Malta, with the abolition of exchange controls in 2004, there now remains little institutional
separation between “onshore” and “offshore” banks with the practical difference lying in the
composition, by domestic or foreign residence, of their deposit and loan clients. Malta abolished
“offshore” companies so called in 1996, with a transition period until 2004, but it remains an OFC
by the de facto definition given above. The 43 double-tax treaties that Malta has concluded so far
with other countries generally provide for offsets of Maltese non-resident taxes (up to specified
maximum rates of tax) against the tax liability of these non-residents of Malta in their country of
residence http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/jmaoltr.html. All except the Swiss and US tax
treaties follow the relevant OECD (2005) Model Tax Convention. 
22 CEBS, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, was established in 2004; CESR,
the Committee of European Securities Regulators, in 2001; and CEIOPS, the Committee of
European Insurance and Occupational Pension Supervisors, in 2003. At the international level, the
last two regional committees cooperate closely with IOSCO, the International Organization of
Securities Commissions, and IAIS, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors,
respectively. 
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combined forces, European Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs) have made
notable progress on the path to openness and legitimacy. As a result, offshore
financial services provided by OFCs and by other jurisdictions that act as
international financial centers, either globally or for a particular region, have
lost some distinctiveness. In new EU member countries, including Malta, the
removal of capital controls by 2004 had largely obliterated the institutional
segregation of offshore from onshore financial business, though the domestic
and international financial business models remain distinct. 
This section assesses prevailing business models for delivering financial
services within the EU to nonresident clients. The focus is on concrete
value-added services provided. An example is Luxembourg, where financial
services in 2003 accounted for 30 percent of gross value added, up from
23 percent in 1995,
23 and for two-thirds of service exports. There the keys to
the financial sector’s success have included a business-friendly approach to
legislation, and the ability to attract and retain highly qualified staff. Other
local assets available in Luxembourg are a full range of allied professional
services, such as legal, accounting and consulting, and a deep technological,
communications and settlement infrastructure. At the same time, as noted in
IMF (2006, p.2), Luxembourg has earned a high reputation for its
financial-service sector by assuring that the sector is prudently capitalized and
able to seize new business opportunities. But it is also prepared to strengthen
financial-sector supervision, in close consultation with those affected, as new
challenges arise for risk management of innovations, or when there is
mounting concern over money-laundering and terrorist finance.
24
With modern communications technology, the final international-financial
services sold to customers may be produced with inputs supplied
competitively from different locations and firms. For instance, there is
a professional investor fund that is licensed in Malta but listed in Dublin. Its
34 The Business Model of Offshore Finance and its Legitimation in the EU
23 The percentages are contained in http://www.statistiques.public.lu/stat/Reportfolders/
reportfolder.aspx Comptes nationaux, Graphique de la structure de la somme des valeurs ajoutées
brutes – A11, 2003. National-accounts estimates of value added by sector do not attribute value
added in ancillary sectors, such as accounting and legal services, to the sector that demands their
output as inputs to its own production. 
24 For distinctions between the conduits of terrorist finance and of money laundering and what
to do about each of them, see von Furstenberg (2005a). For a treatment of international financial
crime with reference to Malta and its Prevention of Money Laundering Act (1994) and
Regulations (2003) see Caruana and Farrugia (2003). Since then a Prevention of Financial
Markets Abuse Act (2005) was passed. 
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a fourth country. What and how offshore financial services are sold can be
determined in part from how they are advertised. In Europe this happens
rather more loudly in the newer growth centers than in the oldest centers such
as Luxembourg. For example, the International Financial Services Centre
(IFSC, accessed 2006) in Dublin assigns the hundreds of international
operations and managed entities in the IFSC program to the categories listed
below. Promotional material, itemized below in italics, has been added for
some of them in this IFSC’s web site.
● Banking
Typical banking activities in the IFSC include asset financing/aircraft
leasing/sales aid financing; international lending and loan syndications;
mutual funds management and administration; bond and commercial
paper issuance; bank treasury operations; back office activities; credit
card operations; management of client treasury functions; securitisations;
and custodial/trustee and administrative services to the mutual funds
industry.
● Insurance
Over a quarter of the IFSC companies are involved in insurance-related
operations, particularly captive insurance and reinsurance. International
activities carried out here include direct-writing insurance, insurance
broking, reinsurance and captive management, risk securitisation and risk
derivatives, back office operations, pan-European pensions, treasury and
asset financing and back office administration. [Captives that were started
by companies for their own insurance needs sometimes have broadened
out by offering coverage also to the firm’s suppliers and customers.]
● Mutual Funds
Funds management companies [and administrators of multiple funds] are
attracted to Ireland for a number of reasons including: low corporation
tax rate; UCITS
25 passport allowing for distribution throughout the EU;
no duty on the registration, issue or transfer of shares or units of interest;
no VAT on fund management services; no withholding tax on most interest
and dividend payments; a wide range of tax transparent fund structures;
and no capital gains tax on funds gains.
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25 Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities, UCITS, are harmonized
collective investment undertakings that can operate throughout the EU without the need for
multiple listings.
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Securitisation has been provided for in the IFSC since 1991, when it
primarily involved transactions in residential mortgages. The Finance
Act, 1996, broadened the range of assets that could be securitized in the
IFSC and gave ‘deemed’ trading status for the special purpose vehicle
(SPV).
● Treasury
Many companies are centralising their treasury operations and are either
managing these themselves or outsourcing them to a bank. Some of the
global treasury activities carried out at the IFSC include: inter-group
lending/financing; cash pooling, netting, cash management; exchange and
interest rate risk management; debt factoring; active management of
group liquidity; cross-border leasing; and bond and commercial paper
issuance. 
There are a number of key incentives for companies locating treasury
operations in Ireland, including: competitive corporate tax rate;
withholding tax exemptions on most interest and dividend payments,
access to Ireland’s large networks of double tax treaties; EU and OECD
membership; and unilateral foreign tax credit relief on interest income
from countries not in the double tax treaty network.
Among the many financial services listed by the IFSC (2006) but not
highlighted in this way are Asset Management, Custody & Trustee, Finance
and Leasing, Hedge Funds, Reinsurance, Special Financial Services, and
Stockbrokerage. Although more is said and Dublin’s IFSC also boasts of other
comparative advantages, it is hard to avoid the impression that its sales pitch
centers on successful tax competition.  Luxembourg, though long under
pressure for providing tax haven services inside the EU, has been less explicit
in advertising its tax advantages to foreign investors, perhaps because, after
decades of prudent practice, advertisement was no longer needed. A full
complement of tax advantages for the providers of offshore financial services
(items (1) through (3) below), as well as their clients (items (4) and (5)
below), typically involves low or no (1) corporation income tax, (2) VAT, (3)
and individual income tax (expatriation allowances), as well as low or no (4)
withholding tax on dividends and interest income, and (5) estate tax (through
anonymity of trust and private-wealth management accounts of nonresidents).
It also involves a network of double-tax treaties that govern the extent of
bilateral tax cooperation and forbearance.
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countries and rising security concerns point to increased cooperation rather
than confrontation in the future. Cooperation has already advanced in one
respect: After considerable resistance and delay, as from July 1, 2005, all EU
member states except Belgium, Luxembourg, and Austria (and territories of
member states such as the Crown Dependencies of Guernsey, the Isle of Man,
and Jersey) agreed to apply the exchange-of-information provisions of the EU
Savings Directive (Council Directive 2003/48/EC, effective July 1, 2005)
26 on
interest payments to individuals resident in other member states. The three
excepted countries will introduce a system of information reporting only at the
end of a transitional period of as yet undetermined length. In the interim they
will levy a withholding tax at the rate of 15 percent for three years until
mid-2008, for another three years at 20 percent until mid-2011, and at
35 percent thereafter. They will transfer 75 percent of the revenue of this
withholding tax to the investor’s state of residence.
The IMF (2006, p. 2) joined Luxembourg in downplaying (spoiling of) the tax
play:
Contrary to widespread concerns, the EU Savings Directive,
which introduced withholding taxes on foreign financial
investments in July 2005, seems to have had little impact on
private banking activities. Moreover the Directive appears to have
created a level playing field among financial centers, further
strengthening Luxembourg’sreputation as an investment location.
Not every territory and country has been as unconcerned about the application
of the Directive. Rogoff (2005, p. 3), for instance, reported that application of
the Directive has been viewed as playing into the hands of East Asian centers:
The Cayman business community strongly opposed the
directive. Considering that up to 20 percent of Cayman’s
financial business involves managing money from EU residents,
the consequences of the directive would be significant capital
flight from Cayman and numerous bank closures. It would prove
difficult for Cayman to compete with offshore jurisdictions that
did not have to comply with the directive, such as Hong Kong
and Singapore. 
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26 The proposal that led to the EU Savings Directive was presented by the Commission of the
European Communities on July 18, 2001. For the full citation see Commission (2001).
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like other major banks, have expanded their private-banking operations in
Singapore to restore tax-haven services to some of their EU customers from
distant offshore locations. Even the OECD (2000, p. 7) has commiserated:
The Committee [on Fiscal Affairs] accepts that the changes
necessary for jurisdictions meeting the tax haven criteria to
commit to remove their harmful tax practices may adversely
affect the economies of some of those jurisdictions.
Yet global competition among tax haven jurisdictions
27 may be imperfect on
account of transaction costs indirectly linked to distance. Rose and Spiegel
(2005), for instance, have found another successful application of the gravity
model in that moving assets offshore incurs a cost that is increasing in
distance between the OFC and its sources of funds. The IMF (2000, p. 10)
likewise lists “proximity to major economies, or to countries attracting capital
inflows” as one of eight legitimate reasons for OFCs.
28 OFCs thus may have
a cost and networking advantage when serving clients of their region. This
limits the strength of the competition to be expected from OFCs based in
other regions. Hence there could be an economic reason why Malta has been
feeling pressure from nearby countries in the EU, and not just from the OECD
and its Model Tax Convention (OECD, 2005), to eliminate Harmful Tax
Practices.
29
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27 The United States also provides tax haven services as it exempts portfolio interest and
interest on deposits paid to nonresident aliens (NRAs) from NRA withholding. Other types of
capital incomes, most notably dividends and real property income and natural resource royalties,
are subject to the NRA withholding requirement at rates ranging from 5 percent to 30 percent as
specified in the bilateral tax treaties of the United States with different countries. However,
Qualified Intermediaries (QIs), often foreign branches of U.S. financial institutions, are not
required to forward documentation obtained from foreign account holders to the U.S. withholding
agent from whom the QI receives payment of U.S. income (IRS, 2006, pp. 5, 15–17), thereby
impeding discovery and international information exchange.
28 The other seven are (1) lower explicit taxation and consequentially increased after tax profit,
(2) simpler prudential regulatory frameworks that reduce implicit taxation, (3) minimum
formalities for incorporation; (4) the existence of adequate legal frameworks that safeguard the
integrity of principal-agent relations,  (6) the reputation of specific OFCs, and the specialist
services provided, (7) freedom from exchange controls, and (8) a means for safeguarding assets
from the impact of litigation etc.
29 Malta was not listed by the OECD (2000, p. 17) as one of the 35 “tax haven” jurisdictions
that had not agreed in advance to eliminate their harmful tax practices.
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After characterizing tax haven countries as thwarting the sovereign fiscal
choices of other countries, the OECD (1998, pp. 37–59; 2000, pp. 24–26;
2004, pp. 14–17) outlined a set of “defensive measures, including non-tax
measures” (OECD, 2000, p. 26; see also 1998, p. 62). These could be taken
unilaterally, multilaterally, or ultimately on a globally coordinated basis, to
induce “uncooperative Tax Haven” countries to stop tax practices judged
harmful to other countries.
For example, [clearly harmful is] a preferential [to nonresidents]
tax regime which is intended and operated to facilitate the
evasion of tax properly owing to other countries, which is
non-transparent and with respect to which the country providing
the regime does not exchange information. Severe
counter-measures are appropriate and indeed necessary to deal
effectively with this extreme type of harmful tax competition.
(OECD, 1998, p. 40).
This is not the place to discuss where to draw the line between beneficial
international tax competition and countries harmfully competing to provide
sanctuary for each other’s tax evaders. Fact is that those on the losing side of
this negative-sum game may decide officially to object and then take
“defensive” measures to cut their losses. Tax haven countries therefore must
seek to come to terms with designated sword carriers such as the OECD. They
do so to protect their international capital flows and financial business from
being disrupted by actual or threatened countermeasures or sanctions. These
could be applied against them or their nonresident clients. All this means that
overt ring-fencing, the practice of providing preferential tax treatment to
non-resident investors by statute, must be ended.
30
To  bolster compliance, the OECD (2000, p. 25) suggests considering
imposing certain transaction taxes (“transactional charges or levies”) from the
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30 Even without formally discriminatory legislation, much has been done to favor nonresident
investors. An example is provided by Malta. After first taxing corporate incomes from
foreign sources at one-third of the 35% tax rate applied to such incomes if generated from
domestic sources, Malta switched to a “neutral” tax imputation system immediately granting
a dividend-paid credit as an offset to two-thirds of the corporation income tax otherwise due in
either case. If, as expected, nonresident dividend recipients find is easier than resident recipients
to conceal the taxable dividends from their respective tax authorities, a de facto tax preference for
nonresident investors remains. 
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suggests that tax treaties with tax haven jurisdictions might have to be
cancelled (1998, pp. 49–50) or at least modified to “contain a limitation of
benefits clause which would prevent the benefits of the treaty from being
claimed by third country residents who have no real connection with the
country or jurisdiction” (2004, p. 16).  In addition, members who feel injured
by harmful tax competition are admonished to consider a broad range of
retaliatory options because “there are no reasons ... why the actions directed
at harmful tax competition should be restricted to the tax area” (OECD, 1998,
pp. 49–50).  Thus OECD countries have availed themselves of rationale and
justification for unilateral and multilateral adoption of punitive measures.
These measures can take different forms. Just like impediments to trade,
capital controls can be applied against inflows or outflows. They can be
applied through the administration of quantitative measures, such as the
licensing of foreign investment projects and of the associated financial
transfers, or through more indirect, price-based or tax-equivalent measures.
The latter are often also described as “market-based” since the response to
them, once set, is determined by market forces and not by administrative
discretion. Examples are dual exchange-rate regimes for trade and
capital-account transactions, or uncompensated deposit requirements to
discourage hot-money inflows. Both quantity- and price-based capital
controls can be applied by the party choosing to impose its own controls or
by parties imposing such controls as a punitive measure upon it. External
capital controls are invariably trade-related and not just through the
balance-of-payments constraint. They also impinge directly on the
competitiveness and profitability of a country’s financial-services business
and hence on its scope, scale, and level of development. In some countries
capital controls also have been used internally to segregate its domestic from
its “offshore” international finance business. 
If a country integrates successfully first into the EU and then EMU, it will be
much better protected against punitive actions by fellow members than if it
had remained on its own. As part of the price of EU-entry, such a country will
have to transpose dozens of directives in the area of financial services into
national regulation and ensure effective enforcement of their provisions by its
supervisory authorities. In return, the country will be financially integrated
into a regional network of financial services providing for cross-border
competition and market access, low-cost post-trade services such as payments
and securities settlements, and legal certainty in a number of respects.
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still warns that unless national supervisors ensure application of “the highest
ethical standards ... also vis-à-vis offshore financial centres,” “market and
political pressure for additional regulatory intervention in these and other
domains will intensify ... The objective is to strengthen disclosure when using
entities in off-shore financial centres.” Yet the new member countries with
a special interest in these matters will also have more say in shaping any such
additional regulatory intervention when they operate as EMU members from
inside.
President Trichet (2006, p. 2) has defined the ECB’s goal of European
financial integration as fully achieved only when all potential participants
have equal access to the European financial market and its instruments and
services, both as suppliers and demanders. Sanctions or “special measures”
directed against particular members do not fit this agenda. Trichet has
explained why achieving this goal is important not only for the effectiveness
of the transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy and for financial stability
but also for the efficiency of financial intermediation and hence for economic
growth. Reports to the Commission (2005, see pp. 14–15 for brief
descriptions of their findings) have contained much of the evidence cited in
this regard.
31 If some countries are better than others at taking advantage of
the common rules to expand their financial services business, there is no basis
for complaint.
Summary of Case 2. Even those OFCs that have achieved solid respectability
got their start by offering lax regulation and supervision of offshore financial
services providers and emphasizing tax-haven benefits. To prosper, they then
had to develop economies of scale and scope and expertise in the provision of
financial services that enabled them to compete also on the basis of superior
efficiencies. The OECD’s and the EU’s initiatives to put an end to certain
“harmful” tax practices, as well as the monitoring, identification, and
reporting mandates tightened after 9/11, have crimped the offshore tax-haven
business in the EU for EU customers. But for offshore centers that are
newcomers to the EU and looking forward to EMU, there are some benefits
that could offset the costs arising from greater transparency about their
business and its nonresident customers: Being plugged into pan-European
decision and operation processes and securities and payments settlement
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31 See especially Commission of the European Communities (1988); Gianetti et al. (2002);
Hartmann, Maddaloni and Manganelli (2003); Kok et al. (2004); London Economics (2002); Sapir
et al. (2004).
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accepting curbs on the tax-haven business. Greater legal certainty and
economic security for participating institutions and their clients may be
another reward for relying on cooperative solutions. In addition, for financial
institutions in Malta that wish to borrow from their central bank as
counterparties of the Eurosystem, gaining the ability to mobilize eligible
collateral held anywhere in the EU-15 countries would be of value to support
their far-flung operations (for a description of the Correspondent Central
Banking Model, CCBM, see ECB, 2005). Once again, what are normally
viewed as macroeconomic choices, such as joining EMU and accepting
common standards, may in part be driven by legitimate financial-service
interests.
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Offshore Financial Development
Jurisdictions in which offshore financial business, conducted mostly in USD,
equals or surpasses onshore business, conducted mostly in local currency, face
unique problems of capital controls and financial management and in the
choice of exchange-rate regime. Policy issues in this last case considered, case
3, relate to the costs and benefits of segregating offshore from onshore
business, fostering international financial business development, and sorting
out the implications of regulations and controls for financial stability and
international relations. Even the continued maintenance of aseparate domestic
monetary unit can become an issue if that unit finds itself increasingly on the
losing side of substitution between local and international currency
denominations. What policy choices do these issues present for Singapore,
Hong Kong, and Shanghai, three unequally competing centers in East Asia?
The experience of Singapore demonstrates that financial-market integration
may interfere with the pursuit of independent monetary-policy objectives
when a large offshore market exists which operates in a currency
denomination, the Asian dollar (an accounting unit whose value is fixed at
one U.S. dollar), that is valued differently from the currency issued for the
home market (the Singapore dollar, SGD, that is subject to a managed float
with inflation targeting). For example, if funds raised in the offshore market
can readily be brought into the local market, there may be upward pressures
on exchange rates, asset prices, and bank money supply that are difficult to
resist. Under such conditions speculative movements of funds could help
create the very conditions that would make speculative attacks, say on
currencies viewed as undervalued, successful. In addition, if domestic credit
tightening left banks free to shift to “cheap” foreign-currency borrowing as
a major source of funds, dangerous currency mismatches could build up on
their balance sheets, as in the run-up to the 1997–98 East Asian crisis.
To prevent such risk exposure, Singapore has partially segregated its financial
business into (a) business conducted by a Domestic Banking Unit (DBU) and
(b) business conducted in an Asian dollar facility known as an Asian Currency
Unit (ACU)
32. Banks are allowed to deal with any currency in the DBU. In the
43
32 Such facilities are not to be confused with the Asian Clearing Union of the same acronym.
That union keeps its settlement accounts in the Asian Monetary Unit (AMU) equal to one USD. 
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swapping funds supplied by the ACU into SGD at the DBU is no longer
prohibited within certain limits, less than 1 percent of what is raised from
banks and nonbanks outside Singapore appears to have been retained in
Singapore. This was found in an investigation by Tee (2003) of the sources
and uses of funds as of July 2002. Hence, at least until then, the separation
between onshore and offshore markets in Singapore remained fairly intact. As
integration of the USD and SGD markets proceeds, the co-habitation, on
many balance sheets, of a local currency with an international currency unit
from outside the region, still characteristic of (South-)East Asia, may be
fraught with unnecessary exchange-rate risks (see Levy Yeyati, 2006).
Consequently, countries may prefer to minimize exchange-rate movements
between the local and the international currency in domestic use by
sacrificing a monetary policy that is geared to domestic objectives
(Hausmann et al., 2000) even when they are “floating.”
Since the 1983 adoption of a USD-based currency-board arrangement known
as “the linked exchange-rate system,” Hong Kong has remained committed to
tying its currency and financial system to USD as its onshore and offshore
markets have been integrated. Except during major regional exchange-rate
crises, the HKD thus has been a near-perfect substitute for USD, sharing its
liquidity, financial depth, low interest rates and its small – formerly mostly
negative
33 – exchange-risk premiums against other major currencies.
(Anegative exchange risk premium of one currency against others is indicated
by systematically lower real interest rates being demanded on the former
currency in free international capital markets so that uncovered interest parity
does not hold.) Almost half of all deposits at Hong Kong banks are in currencies
other than HKD, mostly in USD and increasingly also in renminbi (RMB).
A liberal financial regime has allowed Hong Kong to function  as a major
international financial center for decades, serving not only the entrepôt
functions of both importing and exporting large amounts of finance capital and
FDI but also allowing it to be a sizable net capital exporter.
After the handover to China in 1997, use of the RMB in Hong Kong has been
legalized in ever more uses and in ever larger maximum amounts. Currently
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33 The appearance of a negative risk premium of HKD with USD is somewhat deceptive. The
reason for it is, at least in part, that the tight and numerically explicit weak-side-only limit placed
on fluctuations of the HKD/USD rate from its parity of 7.8, due to its asymmetry, created
a sustained mathematical expectation of some appreciation from parity until the strong-side limit
was made equally tight and explicit. This occurred on May 18, 2005 when the convertibility zone
of 7.75 to 7.85 HKD/USD was introduced.
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monetary uses of yuan (CNY=RMB) in Hong Kong and the freedom to
conduct CNY-denominated business for local customers in Hong Kong
banks. However, lending in RMB by Hong Kong banks currently still is
subject to restrictions. As a result, just as HKD has long been a substantial
currency competitor to CNY in the Pearl River Basin, CNY is becoming an
onshore currency competitor and parallel currency to HKD in Hong Kong. To
the extent a CNY/USD rate that is sticky but not fixed and a HKD that is
hard-fixed against USD continue to co-exist inside China, there will be
greater internal exposure to exchange risk. The shocks to balance-sheets and
competitiveness that could result when the CNY/USD rate moves while two
separate exchange-rate regimes still are maintained inside China may
eventually make the HKD’s currency-board peg to USD politically and
financially unsustainable. On the other hand, once HKD is tied firmly to
RMB in a joint managed float against USD, the loss of distinctiveness may
leave less and less reason for keeping HKD as a separate currency inside
China indefinitely. Thus speculation about the ultimate fate of the HKD has
spread (e.g., von Furstenberg, 2005b; Fung, 2006). Intermediate positions,
such as switching the currency peg of the HKD from USD to RMB, have also
been considered (Genberg, 2006).
HKD and RMB coming into much closer contact with each other alters the
basis for macroeconomic policy choices. For example, when the RMB on its
upward crawl reaches parity with HKD inside, or on the strong side of, the
HKD convertibility zone of 7.85–7.75 per USD, legal interchangeability
between HKD and RMB might be precipitated that could lead to internal
monetary union. Before that, the “one-country, two systems” principle would
have to be modified by mutual agreement.
34 Should the HKD be squeezed out
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34 As summarized on the HKMA website, the Basic Law states that “the Hong Kong dollar
shall continue to be a separate and freely convertible currency; it also prohibits the imposition of
exchange controls and requires the Government of Hong Kong SAR to provide an economic and
legal environment appropriate for the maintenance of Hong Kong’s status as an international
financial centre.” Technically, monetary union at a 1:1 equivalence rate would minimize transition
and information costs as HKD obligations would become dischargeable in equal amounts of RMB,
and HKD notes could remain in circulation as equivalent to RMB notes of the same face amount
until they wear out. Thus new contracts and notes would cease to be issued in HKD, but existing
contracts and notes would not need to be re-denominated or exchanged. Of course there would still
be a host of issues to be dealt with, such as what to do about the fair liquidation of options,
forwards, currency swaps, and other intertemporal derivative products built on the HKD and about
the interest rate on existing variable-rate HKD-denominated claims once the HKD as a separate
currency with its own interest rates has ceased to exist. To deal with these issues, a period of at
least a year of RMB/USD stabilization in the 7.75-7.85 range would be most convenient, pausing
in the currency-board zone long enough for fair and efficient adjustment of financial instruments
and markets before letting the RMB float to a greater degree. 
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immediately raise the question of whether Hong Kong’s pre-eminent
international financial services business can continue to flourish without the
liberal status conferred by the HKD and its present regime. At the very least,
international banking facilities would have to be authorized in Hong Kong to
protect its financial business from any of the external capital controls on the
use of RMB still applied in the mainland.
35 If the HKD is to be folded into the
RMB in future years, it must be done in away that fully protects the capabilities
and global standing of Hong Kong’s international financial business.
There are alternative outcomes to consider. Although Hong Kong continues to
grow its offshore business, partly in HKD, but mostly in USD, it might be able
to become amajor center for offshore financial business in RMB in future years
even while continuing to use HKD internally. Such a development would be
analogous to London having emerged as the center of regional and global
euro-denominated financing activity without the UK relinquishing the pound
(GBP). Whether Hong Kong could follow a similar path without detriment to
its leading role in the eventual internationalization of RMB and the
latter’s emergence as a regional key currency, and anchor for the currencies of
countries to the South of China, is still uncertain. As the Chief Executive of the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA, 2006, p. 1) has stressed, “further
expansion of renminbi business would not only raise Hong Kong’s status as an
international financial centre, but also provide a testing ground for the gradual
move towards full convertibility of the renminbi.” However, it is doubtful that
Hong Kong’s financial institutions will have the lowest funding costs in RMB
in all of China unless Hong Kong ultimately adopts the RMB as its own
currency, thereby achieving internal monetary union. Furthermore, the current
restriction on direct RMB lending to loan clients of Hong Kong banks – aform
of internal capital controls – limits these banks’ability to aggressively bid for
RMB deposits. Thus, consideration for financial business and the choice of
currency, exchange-rate, and capital-control regimes are closely linked. 
As previously discussed for OFCs in Europe, tax bases and rates are
important for where to book international financial business. In the late
1960s, Hong Kong lost out to Singapore as the prime location for starting the
Asian Dollar Market (ADM) in part by refusing (until 1982) to abolish the
interest withholding tax on foreign currency deposits that Singapore had
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35 According to Ma and McCauley (2006), these controls, though rapidly reconfigured and
redirected as needed by China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange, continue to bite for the
time being.
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been highly successful in establishing itself as a low-tax location for
international financial investment. While Hong-Kong’s post-return (July 1,
1997) status as “One Country, Two Systems” allows differences in systems of
taxation, aggressive tax competition for offshore business between Hong
Kong and Shanghai is unlikely beyond what Hong Kong already offers in
competition with Singapore. Hong Kong may outsource routine parts of the
financial business, such as back-office operations, to lower-wage and
lower-rent jurisdictions without losing its leading edge in financial-product
and investment-strategy development and in regional underwriting and
market making. While not seeking to tax foreign-sourced income at all, Hong
Kong’s tax rates are also very low and flat on income from domestic sources
across the board (for instance, 15.5 percent in early 2006 on profits, wages
and salaries, and property gains). Furthermore, its fiscal condition has fully
recovered from difficulties that were encountered earlier this decade partly on
account of unusually high reliance on volatile non-tax revenue sources. All
this and generous expatriate allowances make Hong Kong attractive for high
net-worth individuals who contribute to its offshore financial business. 
Once again, competitive conditions created for financial services are seen to
depend not only on the choice of exchange-rate regime and the degree of
monetary and financial integration, but also on the tax regime and fiscal
soundness. These factors, in conjunction with network economies,
agglomeration benefits, and economies of scale, are probably more important
factors in the choice of location for international financial business than
differences in pay scales for lower-level workers and in rental rates for office
space.
Shanghai
Soon after the Pudong New Area was established in 1990 as
a government-assisted business development project, Shanghai set out to
become amajor competitor for Singapore’sand Hong Kong’soffshore business.
Through development of its futures exchange and of a growing range of
derivatives for hedging and for risk transformation and repackaging, Shanghai
since has taken strides to build the financial infrastructure supporting its bid to
become amajor offshore financial center by 2010. In this regard, Shanghai may
be set to launch the derivative and hedging products that will gradually allow
the RMB to float more noticeably against USD while capital controls continue
to be eased. However, Shanghai has yet to develop the liquidity and market
depth needed to become an able competitor with Hong Kong in any of the major
lines of financial business, including trading of equities. This in spite of the fact
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mainland China are directed to boost Shanghai’s struggling stock market. In
addition, the bond market within mainland China, and foreign participation in
securitization, still need to be developed.  
Given China’s existing external capital controls, Shanghai’s approach is to
segregate offshore from onshore business by preventing local-currency claims
and obligations from being used in the offshore business. As years earlier in
Singapore, this segregation will get in the way of large net capital exports being
intermediated by Shanghai’s offshore sector. To truly become an international
financial center, Shanghai, like Hong Kong, would have to be allowed to offer
international RMB finance and financial instruments to nonresidents rather
than driving this developing business to offshore locations, including
Singapore, or leaving it to IFIs to issue panda bonds to nonresidents. Thus
capital controls complicate developing a jurisdiction’s international financial
business and hamper the emergence of deep and liquid financial markets.
Summary of Case 3.  Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai are at different
stages of financial development, but at each stage there is growing emphasis
on international financial business. Singapore’s offshore market was
segregated from the domestic market to prevent internationalization of SGD
and to safeguard the capacity for an independent monetary policy. Any
remaining capital controls in Hong Kong are internal to China and designed
solely to limit the use of RMB in Hong Kong’s own financial business as if
Hong Kong as a whole were a segregated OFC of China. As these internal
controls are relaxed, and the RMB, with its powerful network externalities
and large potential use for financial services, makes ever more inroads into
Hong Kong’s domestic financial business, the HKD may be squeezed out
between RMB and USD. To the extent Shanghai is attempting to build
a regional financial services center, that center still is fenced in by capital
controls. In these respects Shanghai thus is reliving some of Singapore’s early
history. Since then, in attracting high-risk private financial business,
Singapore has been slow in outgrowing the intermediate stage of IFSC
development. This is a stage at which offshore financial centers still see more
potential in offering a lax regulatory and supervisory environment than
investing in a high reputation for financial soundness by lowering operational
risk and legal hazards.
36
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36 Giap and Kang (2005) devote just 1 out of 38 pages of their comprehensive review of
Singapore’s competitiveness to financial services. They see the Monetary Authority of Singapore
as the nucleus of a financial sector development agency they would like to see established.
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Like with Optimum-Currency-Area (OCA) criteria, most academic
typologies have set out the combinations of choices available with any
particular exchange rate regime in purely macroeconomic terms. Adding
business economics to macroeconomics, this paper has emphasized the
requirements for a flourishing international financial services sector instead
and how they impinge on macroeconomic choices. The paper considered
three cases or situations. These ranged from a brief study contrasting the
choices of Denmark and Malta in ERM II, to looking at Offshore Financial
Centers and their business model in the EU, and to the macroeconomic
operating environment most conducive to three international financial service
centers in East Asia.
Weighing these three cases supports some generalizations.
Promoting a country’s international financial business militates against its:
1. Maintaining internal and external capital controls to prevent currency
substitution.
2. Retaining a local currency with limited financial uses and no international
prospects.
3. Relying principally on tax-haven services to nonresidents and lax
regulation and supervision of offshore financial institutions for growth
beyond the start-up phase.
Conversely, a jurisdiction’s international financial business benefits from its
achieving liquidity and depth in financial markets for the full range of equity,
debt, and derivative products that are needed to conduct trading-intensive
types of financial business. Macroeconomic steps to this end include:
1. Seeking to capitalize on network externalities by gaining insider status and
assured access through close administrative, legal, economic and financial
integration with neighboring jurisdictions.
2. Evolving an international financial currency if a large national or regional
economic base is available to do so.
3. Being prepared to give up having an indigenous currency and agreeing to
regional currency-consolidation if major-currency status cannot otherwise
be achieved. 
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primarily on the interests of their financial services industry. Yet even in some
larger and more diversified jurisdictions, these interests may tip the balance.
Hence they deserve increased attention not least from international
macroeconomists.
Issues for Further Research
Analytically, one of the most important issues that remain to be assessed is the
comparative efficiency of different modes of the international financial
services business, in particular offshore finance. If offshore finance is viewed
as parallel or underground finance by analogy with the underground
economy, it would owe its existence to burdensome tax, regulatory, and
license costs, and to limitations on business powers in the official sector.
These may discourage participation in the official economy in spite of
superior access to legal security and network benefits that it brings.
The contribution of any such, potentially second-best, offshore activity to the
size and efficiency of the networks of the international financial system is
ambiguous. On the one hand the demand for currency and asset substitutions
within countries may be satisfied by OFCs when such substitutions are
blocked within the domestic monetary and financial system. The existence of
OFCs thus could discourage countries from excessive use of seignorage and
of explicit taxes on mobile capital and its yield.
37 On the other hand, such
discipline effects are incidental as countries do not encourage the supply of
OFC services from within their borders to discipline themselves. Rather, they
and the foreign companies they host seek to profit from bypassing the
regulations, prudential supervision, taxes and business restrictions imposed
elsewhere. However, as illustrated by the Barings collapse brought on by
unsupervised offshore trading and position taking in Singapore, high-risk
activities that can be conducted with little or no supervision only in offshore
affiliates still could have the capacity to bring down major financial
institutions operating in both the offshore and onshore sectors. Bankruptcies
on an even larger scale could pose systemic risk if they overwhelmed
networks otherwise designed to isolate trouble and to limit the damage it may
cause. Hence consolidated supervision that extends to operational risks may
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37 Theories of allocatively optimal taxation, by their inverse-elasticity rule, advise taxing the
most mobile or “elastic” tax bases the least. However, their application is complex in this area
since they do not take account of the fact that the degree of this elasticity itself is an inverse
function of the extent of international agreement on maintaining common levels of capital
taxation. Thus the elasticity itself is in part policy determined and a function of the extent of joint
action with others.
5_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 50be required. Integrative steps such as this ultimately could eliminate much of
what still distinguishes onshore from offshore financial operations.
The optimal degree of integration between onshore and offshore activities
may be an issue also for other reasons because the presence of offshore
finance may not significantly contribute to the quality and depth of onshore
finance in the same country. Such a lack of connectedness persists in small,
for remaining residents perennially poor and corrupt, OFC countries, such as
certain island states in the Pacific, including Nauru. It may occur even in large
countries such as mainland China in which capital controls are bracing the
firewall between onshore and offshore financial business sectors. While some
limited transfer between these sectors is allowed there, it is subject to detailed
quantity controls that are imposed for instance through the Qualified
Domestic Institutional Investor and Qualified International Institutional
Investor license and authorization schemes. Observing such continuing
segmentation of financial markets in developing countries raises the question
of when conditions are ripe for quantity controls to be lifted so that arbitrage
can do its work and equalize price rates between onshore and offshore
markets. Thus basic analytical issues relating to the changing needs for and of
OFCs and IFSCs remain to be investigated.
Conclusions 51
5_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 516. References
Abildgren, Kim (2006), “The Foreign-Exchange Market for Danish Kroner,” Danmarks
Nationalbank Monetary Review, First Quarter, pp. 71–85.
Asian Development Bank (cited as ADB) (2005), Progress Report of the Asian Bond
Markets Initiative (ABMI), Nara, Japan, November 30 – December 1.
Association des Banques et Banquiers Luxembourg (cited as ABBL) (2005), Banking in
Luxembourg: Facts and Figures 2005. 
Bonello, Michael C. (2006), “Interview with the Governor on 2 March 2006 with The Times,”
http://www.centralbankmalta.com/updates/Downloads/pdfs/TheTimes-020306.pdf.
Original reference: Vanessa Macdonald (interviewer), “Staying on Top of Change,”
The Times (Malta), The Times Business (Section), March 2, 2006, pp. 8, 9, 11.
Bossone, Biagio; Honohan, Patrick, and Long, Millard F. (2002), “ Policy for Small
Financial Systems,” in Gerard Caprio, Patrick Honohan and Dimitri Vittas, eds.,
Financial Sector Policy for Developing Countries, New York: Oxford University
Press pp. 95–128.
Buiter, Willem H. (1999), “Optimal Currency Areas: Why Does the Exchange-Rate
Regime Matter?” Sixth Royal Bank of Scotland/Scottish Economic Society Annual
Lecture.
Buiter, Willem H., and Grafe, Clemens (2002), “Anchor, Float or Abandon Ship:
Exchange Rate Regimes for Accession Countries,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3184,
January.
Caruana, Frank, and Farrugia, George (2003), “Money Laundering and International
Financial Crime in Small States with Special Reference to Malta,” Bank of Valletta
Review (28), Autumn, pp. 18–32.
Commission of the European Communities (cited as the Commission) (1988), Europe
1992: The Overall Challenge [Summary of the Cecchini Report], SEC(88) 524 final,
Brussels, April 13, http://aei.pitt.edu/3813/01/000209_1.pdf.
Commission (2001), Proposal for a Council Directive to ensure effective taxation of
savings income in the form of interest payments within the Community, COM(2001)
400 final, 2001/0164(CNS), Brussels, July 18.
Commission (2005), Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005–2010),
COM(2005) 177 final, Brussels, March 5.
Danmarks Nationalbank (2003), Monetary Policy in Denmark, June.
European Central Bank (cited as ECB) (2003), “The Demand for Currency in the Euro
Area and the Impact of the Euro Cash Changeover,” Monthly Bulletin, January: pp.
39–51.
ECB (2005), Correspondent Central Banking Model (CCBM), May
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/ccbm2005en.pdf .
Fischer, Stanley (2001), “Exchange-Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?” Journal
of Economic Perspectives 15(2), Spring, pp. 3–24.
52
5_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 52Fung, Enoch (2006) “Can Hong Kong Afford to Keep the Peg?” Goldman Sachs Global
Economics Paper No: 140, April 27. 
Genberg, Hans (2004), “Currency Substitution in Anticipation of EU Accession,” in
Volbert Alexander, Jacques Mélitz, and George M. von Furstenberg, eds., Monetary
Unions and Hard Pegs: Effects on Trade, Financial Development, and Stability,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 337–346.
Genberg, Hans (2006), “Exchange-Rate Arrangements and Financial Integration in East
Asia: On a Collision Course?” Bank of Greece Working Paper No. 41, May.
Giannetti, Mariassunta et al. (2002), Financial Integration, Corporate Financing, and
Economic Growth, CEPR, Final Report to the European Commission, November 22.
Giap, Tan Khee, and Kang, Chen (2005) “Enhancing Singapore’s Competitiveness: Some
Fundamental Rethinking,” Asian Economic Papers 4(3), Fall, pp. 165–202.
HMT reasury (2003), UK Membership of the Single Currency: An Assessment of the Five
Economic Tests, June (Cm 5776), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/
international_issues/ .
Hartmann, Philipp; Maddaloni, Angela, and Manganelli, Simone (2003), The Euro Area
Financial System: Structure, Integration, and Policy Initiatives, European Central
Bank Working Paper No. 230, May.  
Hausmann, Ricardo et al. (2000), “Financial Turmoil and the Choice of Exchange-Rate
Regime,” in Eduardo Fernández-Arias and Ricardo Hausmann, eds., Wanted: World
Financial Stability, Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, pp.
131–164.
Herbertsson, Tryggvi, and Zoega, Gylfi (2006), “On the Fringe of Europe:
Iceland’s Currency Dilemma,” CESifo Forum, Summer, pp. 41–51.
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (cited as HKMA) (2006), “Mr. Joseph Yam proposes
Strategy for Maintenance of the Status of Hong Kong as Financial Centre,” March 23,
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/press/2006/20060323e3.htm
Honohan, Patrick, and Vittas, Dimitri (2002), “Financial Networks and Banking Policy,”
in Gerard Caprio, Patrick Honohan and Dimitri Vittas, eds., Financial Sector Policy
for Developing Countries, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 205–226.
Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Treasury Department (cited as IRS) (2006), Withholding
of Tax on Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Entities For Withholding in 2006,
Publication 515, revised January. 
International Financial Services Centre (IFSC), Dublin (accessed February 2, 2006), Source
directory by categories of financial business, htttp://www.ifsconline.ie/directory.html 
International Monetary Fund (cited as IMF) (2000), Offshore Financial Centers: IMF
Background Paper, 23/6, http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm.
IMF (2006), “Luxembourg – 2006 Article IV Consultation, Concluding Statement of the
IMF Mission,” 1/30, http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2006/013006.htm
Jao, Y. C. (2004? undated), “Shanghai and Hong Kong as International Financial Centers:
Historical Perspective and Contemporary Analysis,” Working Paper, School of
Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong.
References 53
5_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 53Kok, Wim et al. (2004), “Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and
Employment,” Report to the Commission, November,
http://europa.eu.int/Comm/lisbon_strategy/pdf/2004-1866-EN-complete.pdf.
Levy Yeyati, Eduardo (2006), “Financial Dollarization: Evaluating the Consequences,”
Economic Policy (45), January, pp. 61–118.
London Economics (2002), “Quantification of the Macroeconomic Impact of Integration
of EU Financial Markets,” Executive Summary of the Final Report to The European
Commission – Directorate-General for the Internal Market, November,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/studies/summary-londonecon_en.pdf.
Ma, Guonan (2005), “Opening Bond Markets in Asia,” BIS Quarterly Review, December,
pp. 83–93.
Ma, Guonan, and McCauley, Robert N. (2006), “Are China’s Capital Controls Still
Binding?” Paper presented at May 22–27 Bellagio-Italy conference on “New
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Arrangements for East Asia.” 
Ng,  Beoy Kui (1998), “Hong Kong and Singapore as International Financial Centres:
A Comparative Functional Perspective,” Working Paper, Applied Economics
Division, School of Accountancy and Business, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore, August.
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Taylor, Alan M. (2004), Global Capital Markets: Integration,
Crisis and Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (cited as OECD) (1998),
Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, Paris: OECD.
OECD (2000), Toward Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating
Harmful Tax Practices, Report to the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting and
Recommendations by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Paris: OECD.
OECD (2004), The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2004 Progress
Report, Paris: OECD.
OECD (2005), Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Condensed version 15
July, Paris: OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs.
Peng, Wensheng, and Shi, Joanna Y. L. (2003), “Offshore Use of Currency: Hong
Kong’s Experience,” in: China’s Capital Account Liberalisation: International
Perspective, BIS Papers No. 15, April, pp. 166–177.
Rogoff, Natasha Lance (2004), “Tax Me if You Can: Haven or Havoc?” Posted February
19, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/schemes/cayman.html .
Rose, Andrew K. (2004), “The Effect of Common Currencies on International Trade:
A Meta-Analysis,” in Volbert Alexander, Jacques Mélitz, and George M. von
Furstenberg, eds., Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs: Effects on Trade, Financial
Development, and Stability, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 101–111.
Rose, Andrew K. and Spiegel, Mark M. (2005), “Offshore Financial Centers: Parasites or
Symbionts?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2005-05,
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2005/wp05-05bk.pdf 
Sapir, André et al. (2004), An Agenda for a Growing Europe: The Sapir Report, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
54 References
5_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 54Sarno, Lucio (2005), “Toward a Solution to the Puzzles in Exchange-Rate Economics:
Where do we Stand?” Canadian Journal of Economics 38(3), August, pp. 673–708.
Taylor, Edward, and Prystay, Cris (2006), “Swiss Fight against Tax Cheats Aids
Singapore’s Banking Quest: Island Seeks Foreign Deposits to Diversify its Economy;
Denies Wanting ‘Evaders’,” Wall Street Journal, February 6, p. A1. 
Tee, Ong Chong (2003), “Singapore’s Policy of Non-Internationalisation of the Singapore
Dollar and the Asian Dollar Market,” in: China’s Capital Account Liberalisation:
International Perspective, BIS Papers No. 15, April, pp. 93–98.
The Times (of Malta) (2006), “Euro Adoption: ‘Difficult to Imagine’Malta Having to Pay
Fine,” May 4, p. 15.
Trichet, Jean-Claude (2006), Speech given at Otto Beisheim School of Management,
Vallendar, January 13, http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2006/html/sp060113.en.html
von Furstenberg, George M. (2005a), “Terrorist Finance: Within the Grip of the G8?” In
Michele Fratianni et al., eds., New Perspectives on Global Governance: Why America
Needs the G8, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, pp. 193–202.
von Furstenberg, George M. (2005b), “ Comment,” Asian Economic Papers, 4(1), Winter:
pp. 76–84.
von Hagen, Jürgen (2006), “Sovereign Risk Premiums in the European Government Bond
Market,” University of Bonn, April 28.
References 55
5_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 555_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 565_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 575_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 58PROMOTING INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN 
RETAIL PAYMENT SYSTEMS: 








Financial Markets and Statistics Department





Tel. +358 10 831 2249
E-mail: kari.kemppainen@bof.fi
Sinikka Salo





Tel. +358 10 831 2003, 
E-mail: sinikka.salo@bof.fi
59
38 The authors wish to thank the discussant of the paper, Dr Bernhard Speyer from the
Deutsche Bank Research as well as colleagues from the Bank of Finland for their valuable and
insightful comments.
5_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 59Abstract 
The present retail payments clearing and settlement infrastructure in both the
EU and the euro area is still very fragmented. Therefore, it is understandable
that, in recent years, a debate on the sluggishness of the integration of the
European retail payment systems has emerged. The present paper aims at
contributing to this debate by drawing some policy lessons from the theory of
network economics. This is justifiable on the grounds that the retail payment
industry inherently has many characteristics in common with other network
industries, like telecommunications. In the paper, special emphasis is devoted
to the important competition-cooperation nexus in retail payment systems.
The main message of the paper is that the fundamental role of payment
system regulators is to provide a level playing field for different service
providers. Moreover, compatibility and interoperability, e.g. in the form of
commonly adopted standards, are key requirements for the payment system
efficiency, as they facilitate the contestability of the market (competition in
the market). Regarding dynamic efficiency, the regulators also need to ensure
adequate incentives for innovation and investment (competition for the
market). In addition to discussing policy issues at a general level, the paper
analyses developments in the European retail payment systems as well as the
roles and aims of different stakeholders in the current process of building the
Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). 
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Since the introduction of euro banknotes and coins, citizens of the euro area
have been able to make cash payments within and across all 12 countries from
a single purse, using the single currency, as easily as with the previous
national banknotes and coins. Yet what is now reality for cash payments is
still largely a vision for cashless payments. In the area of large value
payments, systems such as TARGET and Euro1 are already offering EU-wide
services. In the area of retail payments, however, the situation is very different
and the fragmentation of the payment landscape is clearly visible. The
introduction of the euro as the single currency will be completed only after
the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) becomes a reality, i.e. when
individuals and corporations are able to make cashless payments in the euro
area or in the EU as easily, efficiently and safely as they can make them today
at the national level. 
The SEPA goal is shared by all stakeholders: the banking industry, user
communities and political authorities. An important step towards the SEPA
was the Regulation 2560/2001 on cross-border payments in euro, adopted in
December 2001.
39 The Regulation eliminated the difference of price between
cross-border and national payments. After the adoption of the Regulation, the
payment service provider sector (mainly the banking sector) activated and
established a common decision-making body, the European Payments
Council (EPC), to foster the development of the SEPA. In 2002, the EPC
published a White Paper where measures and steps towards the SEPA were
presented. This paper set a goal for the SEPA to be achieved by the end of
2010. Thereafter the EPC expressed its conviction that a critical mass of
transactions will have migrated to the SEPA payment instruments by 2010.
However, there are still diverging views on how and when this goal will be
achieved and, despite encouraging progress in the preparatory work; the
fruition of the SEPA appears to be a long way off. In particular, there is still
no harmonisation of standards in cashless retail payments that remain
predominantly based on national payment schemes and consequently national
retail payment clearing and settlement infrastructures remain segmented by
country.
61
39 For the complete text of the Regulation, see Official Journal of the European Communities
(2001).
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interoperability of the current national retail payment systems and/or to create
pan-European system(s) in order to offer customers an efficient pan-European
service level through out the EU. The underlying factor for the debate is that
many national retail payment systems are already functioning efficiently;
what have been lacking are efficient cross-border retail payment systems that
can contribute to the process of deepening financial integration in the whole
area. In this context, it has frequently been emphasised that, in order to reap
the full benefits of a common currency, further integration in retail payments
area is inevitably needed. Some changes are consequently required even in
the most efficient national systems of today as the whole process is dynamic
and forward-looking in its nature. The proper ways and tools how to achieve
these goals have, however, been disputed and rather divergent views have
been presented by different stakeholder groups. 
The aim of the present paper is to contribute to this debate and to try to shed
light into the following questions:  How to promote integration of European
retail payment systems? Are there special factors in the area that should be
taken into account? Can economic theory give some guidance? What kind of
policy conclusions can be drawn? In answering these questions, we build our
analysis on a framework adopted from the theory of network economics. We
believe that the policy debate on the development of the European retail
payment systems can be understood better by reviewing some lessons from
the network economics. This is justified by the fact that the payment system
industry inherently has many characteristics in common with network
industries. In particular, the theory of network industries provides useful
concepts and tools to analyse the interaction in the competition-cooperation
nexus and regulation in retail payment systems.
40
Our general analytical framework is the following: retail payment systems are
analysed as networks and they are looked at as institutional and infrastructural
arrangements for transaction, clearing and settlement processes.
41 Given this
framework, we review briefly academic literature on networks and regulation
of networks and assess their applicability to retail payment systems. Based on
that, we then evaluate the European developments and discuss the potential
policy implications. 
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40 For a wider analysis on network characteristics of retail payment systems and their
regulatory implications, see e.g. Kemppainen (2003, 2006). The theoretical parts of the present
study are built on them.
41 For an interesting analysis of the UK retail payment market, see Gangulny & Milne (2002).
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down the theoretical background for our analysis of challenges in European
retail payment systems. We shortly introduce the basic concepts in network
economics. We start by presenting the main network features, like
externalities, compatibility, and switching costs etc., and discuss their
implications, e.g. tipping, path dependence, the chicken-and-egg problem, on
the market structure of the retail payment systems field. In Chapter 3, we first
describe and then analyse the network implications in the European retail
payment landscape. In particular, we stress the change of focus, from national
separate retail payment areas to one single payment area in the EU, in
payment system developments and related challenges after the introduction of
euro as a common currency. In Chapter 4, we look more closely at the roles
and recent acts of different stakeholders in facilitating the creation of the
Single Payment Area in the EU. In this context, motives of end-users, service
providers as well as authorities are analysed. We put emphasis especially on
the potential roles of public authorities in enhancing the formation of the
Single Payment Area. Finally, in Chapter 5 we summarise our main findings
and draw some policy conclusions.
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In a very simplistic way, payment systems can be characterised as networks
connecting a payer and a payee enabling (cashless) monetary transfers
between them. According to the theory of network economics, a central
feature of networks is that network goods or services exhibit network
externalities (also called network effects by some authors).
42 In a nutshell, this
means that adding another customer adds value to the existing customers of
the network. In this context, the telecommunication system has often been
used as a demonstrative example. In fact, network effects and their
implications on network industries have long been debated especially in
telecommunication industry. The development of the systematic framework
for their analysis was started in the mid 1980s by Katz & Shapiro (1985) and
Farrell & Saloner (1986).
43 It has been stressed that networks play an integral
part also in financial markets and in payment systems. For example,
McAndrews (1997) analyses network effects in payment systems and defines
a network good or service as having two main characteristics: 
(i) the value a person gets from the product increases as more people
consume it
(ii)the technique a firm chooses to produce the product will depend on the
technique chosen by other firms. 
Both these characteristics can be identified in the retail payment service
provision. Concerning point (i), the more widely a payment instrument is
accepted (because it has so many users), the more benefits it brings to
a consumer using it (demand side externality). Concerning point (ii),
economies of scale in production of payment services foster
industry’s willingness for cooperation (common standards, joint network
ownership) in providing these services (supply side externality). Naturally,
both these characteristics cannot be observed in their pure forms in real life.
However, for example, in the adoption process of payment cards and in
mergers of ATM-networks they have clearly played a major role.
44 In the
following, some further key concepts related to network industries are briefly
discussed.
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42 This study uses both terms (network externality and network effect) in interchangeable way.
43 For a summary analysis of the basic structures of networks see e.g. Economides (1996). 
44 See, e.g. Saloner & Shephard (1995) for an empirical analysis of network effects in
ATM-markets.
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2.1.1. Complementarity and compatibility
In network markets, there are complementarities between users and/or
products, which give rise to network externalities. These network
externalities can be classified into two types: direct and indirect externalities
(e.g. Katz and Shapiro 1985, Economides 1996). Direct network externalities
are generated through the direct effects of the number of the agents
consuming the same product, whereas indirect network externalities arise
when the value of product increases as the number of the complementary
goods or services increases (sometimes also referred to as the
hardware-software paradigm). In retail payment systems complementarity
plays an important role. For example, in credit card systems the
complementarity is straightforward: as more people use credit cards, more
merchants are induced to add terminals, since allowing customers
a convenient means of payment will potentially increase their sales, and as
more merchants permit card payment, the value to the customer of having
a credit card increases too (McAndrews 1997). 
Along with complementarity, compatibility between products is also essential
for the existence of network externalities. In essence, for complementarities
to be exploited, interaction channels are needed: it is necessary that products,
users, or systems can interact. This means that complementary products or
systems must operate on the same or compatible standard. According to
Economides (1996), it is compatibility that makes complementarity actual
and is thus crucial in network industries.  In payment systems, compatibility
can, in principle, be achieved by adherence to technical standards. However,
it should be emphasised that “technical compatibility” does not necessarily
mean that different systems or actors can truly interact. The interaction can be
limited by exclusive rights that hinder the interaction. What is also needed is
“commercial compatibility” that ensures that technically compatible products
or systems really can interact because it is possible to limit the potential
interoperability by specific operating rules or entry requirements to systems.
In practice, compatibility at the system level is of crucial importance in
enabling interoperability of systems, e.g. ATM-systems.
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It is often argued that payment systems are subject to economies of scale
because of the significant investment in infrastructure needed to start the
operation (large fixed costs) and a relatively small marginal cost for services
produced over the existing infrastructure. Very large economies of scale in
both retail and wholesale payment systems has been reported in Khiaonarong
(2003), for example. As in the case of traditional industries, this supports the
existence of large production units. This argument is of relevance e.g. for
electronic payment transfers processed by an automated clearing house where
a sufficiently large volume of payments is a prerequisite for the establishment
of such system. 
Consumption externalities
A consumption externality can be defined as the utility increase that a user
derives from consumption of a product as the number of other users who
consume the same product increases. Some authors, e.g. Guibourg (1998),
have labelled this as “demand side economies of scale”. In this context,
consumers’ expectations about the future size of the network are a decisive
factor in the actual size that the network achieves. This means that
consumers’ expectations are often self-fulfilling: the larger the network, the
greater number of additional customers who would like to join it; and
conversely, the smaller the network, the less attractive it is to new customers.
In retail payment services, these consumption externalities are clearly present.
Any payment system, like a giro system, is of no value for a customer if no
other customer is participating in the system. In establishing new payment
systems or instruments, consumers’ expectations of the future size of the
payment network are also crucial. In practice, the difficulty of achieving
a critical mass of users tends to limit the adoption of new payment
instruments.
Switching costs
In network industries, consumers and firms often have to face extra costs if
they switch from one network to another. If high enough, these switching
costs may effectively lock the user into the existing system and provide
barriers that prevent them from entering into another network. Switching cost
may lead to inefficiency by preventing users from adopting a new superior
technology. They may also support monopolistic pricing practices.
According to Shy (2001), switching costs can be significant in many service
industries including banking. From the customers’ point of view, the costs
66 Payment systems as a network industry
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and opening an account and switching the activities to a different bank) could
be significant. Accordingly, some sort of lock-in effect may prevent
customers from frequently switching among payment service providers. Also
from the payment service providers’ point of view, switching costs can be
significant: e.g. upgrading or changing to a new payment system may require
large investments in computer systems and training.
2.2. Basic market structure implications in network industries
The basic features in network industries described above bring along specific
market structure implications that can typically be seen in many network
industries. In the following, we will discuss them shortly.
Tipping
In network markets, market dynamics may lead to extreme outcomes where
one network good or service provider dominates the market. Besen and
Farrell (1994) label this phenomenon as “tipping”.
45 The existence of one
dominant system can be explained by the economies of scale in production
and positive demand side externalities. This “tipping” –phenomenon can also
be seen in retail payment systems. At the national level, it is common that
only one major retail payment system exists. In some cases, two or more
systems may exist in parallel but they are often dedicated to different payment
instruments (e.g. paper-based vs. electronic). However, enough heterogeneity
in demand for different payment instruments may enable the existence of
more than one retail payment system.
Excess inertia / excess momentum
Network markets may tend to get locked-in to obsolete standards or
technologies. This excess inertia means that users tend to stick with an
established technology even when total surplus would be greater were they to
adopt a new but incompatible technology (Katz and Shapiro 1994). This can
be explained, as pointed out by Farrell and Saloner (1986), by the fact that
today’s consumers may be reluctant to adopt a new technology if they must
bear the cost of transition from one technology to the next, and if most of the
benefits of switching will accrue to future users. 
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and the virtual elimination of its Betamax rival is often used as an example.
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also exhibit the opposite of excess inertia, which they call “insufficient
friction” (also referred to as excess momentum). The market may then be
biased in favour of a new, superior, but incompatible technology. Katz and
Shapiro call the reason as “stranding”: today’s buyers may ignore the costs
they impose on yesterday’s buyers by adopting a new and incompatible
technology. Accordingly, those who previously bought the old technology are
stranded. Both effects are also possible in retail payment service markets, but
as in many network markets, excess inertia is normally the dominant
characteristic. An example is the slow e-money adoption where the service
providers have long waited for its start-up but customers have been reluctant
to start to use it. 
Path dependence
In network markets history matters: network market equilibrium cannot be
explained without reference to the pattern of technology adoption in the
earlier periods.
46 This means that the effects of decisions by early adopters on
the decisions of later adopters are often significant in network markets. In
payment systems, path dependence can be seen in the development of
national payment systems and, especially, in the slow change of national
payment habits. For example, the division of giro- and cheque countries in the
European Union is still prevailing, and probably mostly due to historical
reasons.
Critical mass and chicken-and-egg problem 
Critical mass or installed base of network facilities plays a crucial role in the
start up and growth of a network. The start up problem is often referred to as
the  chicken-and-egg problem: many consumers are not interested in
purchasing the good because the installed base is too small, and the installed
base is too small because an insufficiently small number of consumers have
purchased the good. Accordingly, the potential problem for the payment
system development is that a new, more efficient payment system may not
attract enough customers to validate its existence. 
Underproduction
Network effects may also lead to possible underproduction of network goods
or services. According to McAndrews (1997), the market production of
network services may often be inefficiently low because using a network
68 Payment systems as a network industry
46 See e.g. Liebowitz & Margolis (1995).
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users typically disregard in making their decisions. For example, when
deciding whether to join a service network, consumers do not take into
account the benefit to other users of that larger network. Accordingly, the
equilibrium network size is smaller than the social optimum, when social
benefits of joining a network exceed the private benefits. In the retail payment
systems area, where economies of scale are also present at least in the
electronic payments, some authors (e.g. Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2002))
have argued that the underproduction is a relevant problem and it should be
influenced by actions of relevant authorities.
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landscape
When looking at the potential network implications on the European retail
payment landscape, the following background factors are useful to keep in
mind. The payment systems in the European Union were originally created to
meet domestic requirements. As a result, the current landscape of the
European retail payment market is characterised by considerable
fragmentation, diversity of standards and different levels of efficiency in
national systems. The development efforts of retail payment systems were
normally (and quite justifiably) directed to respond to needs of domestic
payment traffic: the vast majority of retail payments were national. In fact,
even today only 2–3 % of all retail payments are cross-border payments –
a fact which may of course reflect the inconvenience of cross-border
payments more than lack of potential demand. A fundamental question here
is whether there is no demand for cross-border payment methods because
there is inadequate supply of them, or is it vice versa. In any case, the
situation has many characteristics of the traditional “chicken-and-egg”
problem. Judged from the pan-European viewpoint, it can, however, be
argued that the lack of efficient cross-border payment methods and systems
should in no case act as an impediment to cross-border business transactions
no matter how big or small these transactions would be. The borderless
pan-European payment landscape is the sub-target of financial market
integration process and the true Single Markets in the spirit of the Lisbon
Agenda.
With the introduction of the Single Market concept in 1992 and even more
concretely so with the introduction of the common currency, the euro, the
focus of the relevant payment market has changed from national to euro area
/ EU. The Single Market in goods and services inevitably needs payment
systems that also operate smoothly and efficiently in the whole context of the




47 For a comprehensive analysis of financial market integration in the EU, see e.g. Koskenkylä
(2004).
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pricing have attracted the attention of the EU policy-makers ever since the
introduction of the Single Market –concept in 1992. Since then the
development in the European retail payment markets has been monitored by
the public authorities. According to the pricing surveys by the European
Commission
48, service providers had been very slow in making any progress
in the cross-border retail payments field. The prices of cross-border payments
had remained at high levels and their execution times a lot longer compared
to domestic retail payments, even on the eve of introduction of the euro notes
and coins. The reasons for this slow progress are many-faceted. On the one
hand, payment service providers have emphasised that “there is no business
case” to develop and invest in new cross-border retail payment infrastructures
because there is not sufficient demand for these services. On the other hand,
the authorities and consumer associations have maintained that the high
prices are the principal obstacle to activating and expanding the demand for
these services.
Avariety of infrastructural factors may also have delayed the development of
efficient cross-border retail payment systems in Europe. One of the main
factors is the existence of different national payments systems, which have
developed within different historical contexts, with different governance,
access, pricing and transparency traditions as well as different legislative
environments. As a result, the retail payment infrastructure in the European
Union is fragmented and it is still largely based on traditional national
payment habits and characteristics. Figures 1–4 provide two illustrative
snapshots of the situation.
49
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crossborder/index_en.htm; Retail Banking Research (2005a, 2005b) 
49 For a comprehensive analysis using this kind of framework, see Leinonen (2001).
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Data source: ECB (2006b)
Fig. 2. Number of cashless payments per inhabitant in EU15 countries, 2004
Data source: ECB (2006b)
Fig. 3. Number of cashless payments per inhabitant in new EU Member States, 2000
Data source: ECB (2005)
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Data source: ECB (2005)
In Figures 1–4, the fragmented structure of retail payment methods in the EU
countries can be clearly seen. The figures also illustrate the fact that payment
habits are slow to change. In some countries, like France, the cheque
continues to be an important payment method even though its relative share
has been declining in recent years. In other countries, like Finland, credit
transfers are dominating and cheques have virtually disappeared. Naturally
the differences in payment methods used in different countries are reflected
in the structure and organisation of payment systems in these countries. In the
new Member States, the fragmentation of cashless payment methods is also
present but in many cases the high use of credit transfers and card payments
is noticeable.   
Generally speaking, the development of payment system infrastructures in
different countries is likely to have been influenced by some sort of path
dependence
50 (“history matters”) where the key ingredients are the structure
of service providing sector, national payment traditions and legislative
environment. Consequently, each national payment system has its own
membership criteria, standards and practices that have evolved over time.
Figures 1 and 2 provide an illustrative example of rather “strong” path
dependence in the EU15 countries. In contrast, a nice example of the
“weaker” path dependence for the new Member States can be seen in Figures
3 and 4: many of the new Member States have very rapidly been able to adopt
the most efficient payment methods – probably partly so because of the
lighter burden from the historical systems. In addition, another factor
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path dependence is the QWERTY-keyboard system. 
5_2006  22/1/07  0:01  Stránka 73affecting the development of national payment systems is the observation that
payment habits are slow to change. This applies especially to consumers, and,
to a lesser extent, also to enterprises. It is obvious that these factors have
affected the development of payment systems, but, only the coming years will
tell, if the development of payment transfer technology, accelerating financial
integration and deepening global financial linkages will change the picture.  
Figures 1–4 support also the argument that the retail payment infrastructure
in the EU consists of 25 distinct payment areas even though some
convergence has taken place. In this context, it has been claimed that the
present heterogeneity in the retail payments field can potentially hinder the
development of efficient cross-border retail payment systems. The idea
behind this argument is that the heterogeneity in demand for different
payment instruments in different countries makes it more difficult to develop
truly compatible payment systems or one common cross-border system
because of different national needs. On the other hand, the formation of Single
Euro Payments Area / a Single Payment Area in the EU may not necessarily
mean that the national payment habits and methods should be totally
harmonised; more important is that reliable and efficient cross-border retail
payment methods and systems can be established. Even if, in the long run, the
goal is to phase out the purely national and non-interoperable payment
systems (at least regarding credit transfers, direct debits and card payments)
and replace them with the common euro area wide systems which are defined
in the context of the SEPA project, the national payment habits and
preferences will of course be free to determine the market shares of the
different payment methods available. However, it should also be recognised
that changes cannot take place very rapidly because path dependence is quite
strongly present in payment service business which is further supported by
excess inertia and switching costs both on demand and supply sides. 
When further examining the situation at the cross-country level, the following
observations can be made. As stressed above, the current national/domestic
retail payment systems are the results of development processes that have
been strongly guided by “the national payment habits” and, therefore, the
organisation and operating procedures of national retail payment systems
differ from each other. In some countries, the degree of electronification in
retail payments processing is high and the retail payment systems function
(technically) efficiently
51. In this context, one important factor contributing to
74 Network implications on the European retail payment landscape
51 Naturally, technical efficiency does not necessarily imply economic efficiency, e.g. if
monopolistic pricing distorts users’ decisions resulting in under- or overuse of the service. 
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Standards in retail payment systems have traditionally been set domestically
by national authorities and banking associations. Accordingly, the
standardisation process at the national levels has benefited from relatively
small and homogeneous stakeholder groups. However, standardisation at the
cross-border level has been more of a problem because of the greater number
of different parties involved and strict adherence to heterogeneous domestic
standards adopted in different payment methods. This has surely slowed
down the development and implementation of international retail payment
standards, which has, in turn, negatively affected the establishment of
efficient cross-border retail payment systems. 
Another factor affecting the slow development of cross-border retail payment
systems in the EU is the low volume of cross-border retail payments. These
payments account currently for 2–3 % of all retail payments in the EU.
Whether this figure will increase in the future naturally depends on
customers’ needs, but also on the existence of efficient cross-border retail
payments systems to execute payments reliably and cheaply. The
establishment of such an infrastructure will require cooperative efforts by the
service providing sector. However, as pointed out in the beginning of this
section, the service providing sector may be unwilling to invest in these
systems if it does not see it as a profitable business. Accordingly, a sort of
chicken-and-egg problem may further delay the establishment of efficient
cross-border payment systems.
Competition-cooperation nexus
In the European retail payment landscape and especially in the development
of cross-border retail payment systems, the competition-cooperation nexus
has been observable. The following quotation ECB (2001b)
52 nicely reveals
the challenges that the competition-cooperation nexus brings along:
“The lack of competition among banks explains the lack of progress with
regard the price level of cross-border credit transfers, whereas the lack of
co-operation on standards and infrastructures explains the lack of progress in
reducing the cost of processing cross-border transfers.”
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was going on in that time concerning the Regulation of retail payment prices
but it also clearly presents the competition-cooperation nexus in the provision
of retail payment services. On the one hand, cooperation among service
providers is needed on establishing standards and infrastructures in order to
have a large enough customer base for their services (“network effect”). On
the other hand, agreement on common standards (compatibility) increases
competition and may thus reduce service providers’ incentives for the
increased compatibility (“competition effect”). Accordingly, the crucial
question for policy-makers and regulators is to find measures that maximise
social welfare in this type of environment.
The competition-cooperation nexus is directly connected to the stylised
market structure in retail payment markets where the vertical structure of
industry is common. Accordingly, the basic framework of retail payment
industry can be generalised as follows:
Payment service providers compete directly in the provision of retail
payments instruments and services to end-users but, at the same time, they
also cooperate in shared payment networks. 
In other words, it can also be said that there is “upstream cooperation
combined with downstream competition”
53. This poses several challenges to
public authorities. On the one hand, viewed from the efficiency standpoint, it
is desirable to facilitate the utilisation of economies of scale by means of
allowing cooperation between market players. On the other hand, there is also
a risk that such cooperative arrangements may be anti-competitive. From
a competition policy point of view, it is possible that cooperation at one level
may lead to collusive behaviour at another level. For payment system
regulators, these are crucial concerns in assessing the trade-off between
competition and cooperation. In this context, straightforward application of
economic theory will need to be supplemented by taking into account all the
industry-specific characteristics. 
In general, it has been argued that market competition is the way to promote
efficiency in many traditional industries. In retail payment markets,
a particular characteristic is, however, that competition among market
participants needs to coexist with the mutual cooperation in payment system
76 Network implications on the European retail payment landscape
53 McAndrews & Rob (1996)
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providers are able to achieve an adequate balance between competition and
cooperation to benefit market users. Therefore, public authorities should
consider whether the market structure supports innovation and new market
entrants, and whether existing access restrictions serve to promote or impede
competition and contestability.
54
In retail payment systems, cooperation is required among market participants
in the context of their participation in payment system infrastructure
arrangements. The main issue for regulators is then whether this cooperation
supports market efficiency. The BIS (2003) report argues that established
payment networks are a typical context in which this issue will arise. They
have the potential to provide a stepping stone for innovation but they are also
in a position to create entry barriers that impede competition and innovation.
In protecting their own interests, members of established payment networks
can create entry barriers either by imposing access restrictions or by more
indirect means, for example by a choice of standards and rules that are
inappropriate, difficult or costly for other payment initiatives to adopt.
A related question is whether competition between different systems or
competition in one system is better for overall market efficiency. If excluded
entrants to a particular system decided to establish their own system that was
more efficient and they are also able to attract enough customers for the new
system to survive, market efficiency could be fostered. However, the
uncertainty in reaching the critical mass of users may make the establishment
of the new system difficult. Also, the co-existence of multiple systems and
standards may imply extra costs both for the users (imperfect compatibility)
and the service providers (unutilised scale economies). This clearly points out
the importance of market dynamics in network industries that strongly affects
the market structure.
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Payment Market 
In principle, the key parties that are involved in the development process of
retail payment systems can be grouped into three groups: (i) End-users, (ii)
Payment service providers, and (iii) Regulators. In the following, their
motives and roles are discussed. In addition, their recent acts are presented in
the European context.
(i) End-users 
In retail payments, customers (i.e. consumers and enterprises) are the
end-users of the payment services. Accordingly, their behaviour (usage
decisions) finally decides which payment instruments (and respective
payment systems) survive in the long-run. Especially, their adoption patterns
of new payment instruments play an important role in shaping the future
payment systems. As in many other network industries, end-users’
expectations about the future overall usage of different instruments affect the
actual adoption of these instruments also in retail payment systems. Ideally,
some sort of form for “coordination of expectations” would be important,
because users need to form their expectations (and their respective decisions)
on which technology will be widely used by other users. The practical
problem is that very often the decision of which payment method is chosen
depends on the present price and availability of usage points of the payment
instruments. When the present users are few and the price is high, a new
payment method has a lot of difficulties to achieve the critical mass needed to
utilise potential economies of scale in its production and thereby validate its
existence. In a practical context, the previous observation that “the payment
habits are slow to change” is also relevant when new payment methods are
introduced to customers. Accordingly, the adoption incentives of end-users
55
surely play an important role in fostering efficiency of retail payment
systems. 
(ii) Payment service providers
The banking sector has traditionally been and still is the main payment service
provider even though some new service providers are now emerging. As in any
78
55 It is worth noting that in recent SEPA discussions the importance of the end-users’ needs
have been emphasised.
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of a real business case” as many bankers have phrased it) are crucial when
establishing payment infrastructure. Therefore, without sufficient innovation
incentives, the development of efficient infrastructure is doomed to be slow. In
the context of European cross-border retail payments, the banking sector has
emphasised that the slow development of the systems was due to low demand
for these payments and the consequent lack of a real business case. However,
after the adoption of the Regulation on Cross-border Payments in Euro
(2560/2001), the banking sector “was forced” to act.
56As a direct reaction, the
banking sector established the European Payments Council (EPC) in June 2002
to represent the industry and to support and lead the development of the Single
Euro Payments Area (SEPA).Moreover, the EPC also published aWhite Paper:
Euroland: Our Single Payment Area!
57 and it has continued its work towards
SEPA by adopting Rule Books on credit transfers and direct debits as well as
SEPACards Framework. The European banking sector has signalled that they
are prepared to move forward the necessary harmonisation of payment systems
and instruments, as much as possible through self-regulation. In their opinion,
legislation and regulation should only be used where the harmonisation cannot
be achieved by other means.
(iii) Regulators
In the EU/Euro Area, the main regulators in the payment service field are the
European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB)/ the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) along with the relevant competition
authorities. Next, their respective, partly overlapping, roles are discussed.
The European Commission
When fulfilling its role in promoting the development of the Single Market,
the European Commission has been active in facilitating financial market
integration. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Commission has been
arguing that high costs for cross-border money transfers are inhibiting the
Single Market development and financial market integration. In this context,
the Commission has formulated the following objectives for the single
payment area:
● to make the Internal Market the domestic market
● to promote efficient and secure payment means and systems
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56Atheoretical analysis on the potential effects of the Regulation on cross-border payments in
Euro can be found in Kemppainen (2005).
57 European Payments Council (2002): “Euroland: Our Single Payment Area!”, May 2002.
http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.org.
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relating to all payment means
● to ensure competition on equal terms in a level playing field.
In pursuing these goals, the Commission has assumed a more active role in
recent years. The fact that the charges for cross-border retail credit transfers
had remained high over the years prompted the European Parliament and the
Council to adopt Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001 on Cross-border Payments
in Euro in December 2001. The Regulation aims at facilitating the expansion
of the “Single Market” concept to cover the money transfers and payment
systems markets as well. The adoption of the Regulation was seen as the
ultimate tool to foster the development of the market where, according to the
Commission, “no substantial development efforts by market participants”
were observed before that. In December 2005, the Commission adopted
a proposal for a Directive, earlier known as New Legal Framework (NLF) for
Payments in the Internal Market. This proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on payment services in the Internal
Market should establish a modern and comprehensive set of rules for all
payment services in the European Union and form a comprehensive legal
basis for SEPA developments.
58 Parallel to this directive proposal, the
Commission has also issued the so-called SEPA Incentives Paper (nowadays
referred to as “Next steps”) that analyses the current situation and identifies
a number of areas and issues where supplementary action may be required to
achieve the full economic potential of SEPA.
59 Very recently, the Commission
also launched a public consultation on the Interim Report on Payment Cards
and Payment Systems. According to the Commissioner Kroes, the inquiries
are an important first step in allowing the Commission to identify ways to
improve competition in EU financial markets.
60
European Central Bank and the European System of Central Banks
The central banks’ interest in the efficiency of payment systems is based on
the Article 105(2) of the Treaty and the Article 22 of the Statute. According
to these, the European System of Central Banks shall promote the smooth
operation of payment systems. This also includes facilitating and ensuring the
80 Roles of different stakeholders in developing Single Payment Market
58 For more information on the Directive proposal and the earlier initiatives, see the
Commission’s web page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/payment/area/index.htm
59 See the Commission’s webpage:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/payments/sepa/index_en.htm
60 See, DG Competition’s web page: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/ sector_inquiries/financial services.
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banks have also defined financial integration as one of their main objectives.
In the beginning of 2005, the ECB and the national central banks agreed on
a document of “Strategic intents of the Eurosystem”. This document gives
a high priority to unification of financial systems, and, by implication, the
payment systems as well. The relevant phrase in the document is as follows:
“The Eurosystem shall aim to safeguard financial stability and promote
European financial integration in cooperation with the established
institutional structures.” As such, this document did not mark any change in
the ESCB policy. But it confirmed that for the ECB and the Eurosystem as
a whole, promoting financial integration is not only a means to an end, it is
also a goal in itself. 
In the area of retail payment systems, the Eurosystem has focused on the
importance of providing efficiency and safety standards for retail payment
instruments and euro retail payment systems with the aim of fostering the
achievement of a single euro payment area. In principle, both the safety and
efficiency targets are important, and in many cases, as in the large-value
payment systems where potential for systemic risk is bigger than in retail
payments, the safety requirement is the first one to be achieved. However, in
retail payment systems as well, the same safety requirement is important as
the central banks should also ensure that the public confidence in payment
media is not put in danger in any circumstances.
The ECB/ESCB has communicated its policy stance on retail payment issues
by publishing various reports and studies. The ECB has published two reports
“Improving Cross-Border Retail Payment Services – the Eurosystem’s view
(September 1999) and Improving Cross-Border Retail Payment Services –
Progress Report (September 2000) in which it highlighted inefficiencies and
set objectives for cross-border retail payments. Moreover, the ECB Monthly
Bulletin article in February 2001 Towards a Uniform Service Level for Retail
Payments in the Euro Area examined the variety of issues in retail payments
area. In November 2001, the ECB prepared a report Towards an Integrated
Infrastructure for Credit Transfers in Euro, in which it reviewed ways to
remove obstacles that are the origin of the high costs of retail cross-border
credit transfers and provided an overview of measures to improve the
payment infrastructures. The ECB reports Towards a Single Euro Payments
Area – Progress Reports (ECB, 2003, 2004, 2006a) assessed developments
achieved in retail payment system field. In the reports, the
Eurosystem’s strong support for the banking sector’s Single Euro Payments
Area –project was emphasised. Moreover, the importance of the
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latest Progress report, the Eurosystem’s vision for the SEPA was clearly
stated: “a euro area in which all payments are domestic, where the current
differentiation between national and cross-border payments no longer
exists.”
61
Altogether, one of the most essential future tasks for all the key parties,
including both service providers and regulators, involved in the development
of retail payment systems is to strengthen their cooperation so that efforts can
be focused on the most relevant issues and overlapping development efforts
can be avoided. On the regulatory side, the cooperation between the European
Commission and the ECB/ESCB is crucial in order to avoid the situation
where too extensive and overlapping regulation would act as an impediment
to the development. Furthermore, the roles of competition authorities and
other regulators (including central banks as overseers of the payment
systems) in the quest for the market contestability and payment systems
efficiency are not totally clear both at the national as well as at the European
level. This is likely to require further cooperation efforts, at least at the
European level.
62
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61 See, ECB (2006a) “Towards a Single Euro Payments Area: Objectives and Deadlines –
a Fourth Progress Report”, p. 4.
62Arecent example of the increased authority cooperation is the joint statement from European
Commission and the European Central Bank: “Single Euro Payments Area”. See e.g. ECB’s web
page: http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2006/html/pr060504_1.en.html 
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Given that the European retail payment systems display a very large degree
of fragmentation and national idiosyncrasies, and that for the EU authorities
and the central banks financial integration is of a very high priority, it is only
natural to expect that the authorities seek ways to promote further integration
in this field. Even though financial integration is now defined as a goal in
itself, it should also be clear that well-functioning and integrated payment
system is a necessary condition for the existence of a truly single market, both
in financial services, and in other retail markets as well.  This is of utmost
importance for reaping the full benefits of the common currency.
A successfully conducted and implemented integration process will lead to
a situation where no “national payment borders” exist anymore and the most
efficient and reliable payment methods and systems are adopted EU-wide.
Furthermore, integrated and efficient retail payment market will contribute to
the realisation of the Community’s Lisbon agenda.
The Single Euro Payments Area project aims to contribute to the Lisbon
agenda on its own part. Ideally, the SEPA-project is a market-driven process
where the authorities ensure a level playing field for different service
providers. Currently, there is a strong political commitment to SEPA-project
but some practical difficulties have arisen due to the differences in national
payment habits and systems. The evident path dependence in developing
payment systems and other vested interests of payment service providers may
make the process challenging, but the commitment of all the stakeholders to
achieve the final goal will help to overcome the potential obstacles. 
When examined from the general payment system policy point of view, the
arguments reviewed in this paper reveal the complex and many-faceted nature
of retail payments that has clear repercussions on the retail payment systems
and their developments. The network characteristics present in retail payment
systems should be recognised and taken into account by all stakeholders in
the field. This implies, for instance, that the national differences we observe
today do not necessarily reflect differences in national preferences of
technological possibilities. Rather, as we pointed out above, they can also be
explained to be just the result of historical development – the “path
dependence” that is typical for network industries. This observation
challenges one of the possible objections to unification, the statement that the
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menu of common instruments could not suit all countries’ needs.
The other objection raised by payment service providers, namely the lacking
business case, is also likely to be based on too a narrow and limited view of
the total impact of European integration. In general, the deepening economic
integration process will inevitably increase cross-border trade. In particular, if
we recognize the importance of the payment infrastructure for the contestable
markets for retail goods and services, we may also predict that increased
interoperability and/or unification of the payments systems facilitating more
efficient payment services will lead to a significant growth of cross-border
transactions. The current home country bias of payment traffic is, at least to
some extent, a product of a fragmented payments infrastructure. Unified
payment system infrastructure and common payment products can surely
remove potential barriers for cross-border business as well as retail
transactions.
All the above observations, along with the general characteristics of network
markets, suggest that an optimal degree of efficiency and integration may not
be achieved by markets themselves without some intervention by the
authorities. The appropriate nature and scope of this intervention is a much
more difficult question, however. In principle, the authorities have several
options available for regulating the retail payments market.
63 They can leave
development to the market and aim simply to foster a competitive
environment and facilitate investment incentives in the field, e.g. by assuming
a tolerant attitude towards payment system joint ventures and other types of
cooperation. They can also act as a catalyst or facilitator for development,
e.g. by participating in the development of payment standards and supporting
the work of cooperative groups formed within the industry. As a stronger
measure, they can resort to specific regulation to influence market
development, e.g. enforcement of standards. Finally, as the ultimate measure,
the authorities can become ‘operationally active’ by establishing their own
systems for providing payment services. However, this last option should
only be used when the authorities judge that reliable and efficient payment
systems cannot be provided by the market.
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63 For an extensive analysis on the policies relating to the efficiency and safety of retail
payments, especially from the viewpoint of central banks, see BIS (2003). For a comprehensive
discussion on central bank oversight of payment and settlement systems, see BIS (2005).
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authorities must promote some form of coordination among market
participants. Inevitably, compatibility and interoperability of different retail
payment systems by means of common and open standards are needed to
exploit the potential economies of scale. Moreover, the network structure of
the industry (upstream cooperation combined with downstream competition)
would ideally facilitate the efficiency gains. Therefore, the authorities should
not take too restrictive an attitude towards cooperation among payment
service providers. Indeed, they probably should adopt a more active role as
catalysts for the beneficial forms of cooperation and coordination.
However, the authorities also have a regulatory role to play. They must
continuously monitor the market and ensure that cooperation among service
providers does not lead to anti-competitive practices which would harm the
end-users of payment systems. First and foremost, this involves monitoring
and assessing access conditions to payment systems and memberships of
organisations developing and operating them. The systems must be open and
entry of new service providers must be possible without discriminatory fees
or other unfair conditions. However, entry/access conditions must also be
formulated so that payment systems and their operations themselves do not
jeopardise the financial stability. 
The other difficult part of entry/access regulation is of course to practice it so
that it does not reduce incentives to innovate and develop new services or
technological solutions. Innovators must be allowed to reap profits for their
work. In other regulated industries, there have been very thorny cases, and it
is only natural to expect that they emerge also in the area of payment systems
in Europe. The problem is not only how to determine fair terms of access, but
also to delineate the forms of permissible cooperation, in which the fair access
requirements are imposed. The broader the range of activities where common
organisations and joint ventures are permitted, the more difficult the questions
of fair access become.
To sum up our main policy message, the following can be concluded. We note
that the practical challenges for authorities and private operators alike should
not be underestimated. Banks and other operators must prepare themselves
for the technical changes and marketing tasks required by the harmonisation
of payment products and the inevitable unification of the European payment
systems. The authorities, for their part, must also develop new competencies.
They must continuously monitor the markets and learn how to assess the
developments in the market for payment services, and prepare to deal not only
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vs. unfair market practices etc. On the other hand, many of these challenges
have already been with us for a long time at the national level. In the future
we must deal with them at the European level, where the stakes are bigger,
and transparency and peer pressure are more and more important
considerations.
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SUERF –
Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières 
SUERF is incorporated in France as a non-profit-making Association. It was
founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who
have an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems,
and the conduct of monetary and regulatory policy.
SUERF is a network association of central bankers, bankers and other
practitioners in the financial sector, and academics with the purpose of
analysing and understanding European financial markets, institutions and
systems, and the conduct of regulation and monetary policy. It organises
regular Colloquia, lectures and seminars and each year publishes several
analytical studies in the form of SUERF Studies.
SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat located
at the Austrian National Bank in Vienna. It is financed by annual corporate,
personal and academic institution membership fees. Corporate membership
currently includes major European financial institutions and Central Banks.
SUERF is strongly supported by Central Banks in Europe and its membership
comprises most of Europe’s Central Banks (29 in total, including the Bank for
International Settlements and the European Central Bank), banks, other
financial institutions and academics.
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1997 – 2002
For details of SUERF Studies published prior to 2003 (Nos. 1 to 22) please
consult the SUERF website at www.suerf.org.
2003
2003/1 Bert Scholtens, Dick van Wensveen, The Theory of Financial
Intermediation: An Essay on What it Does (Not) Explain, Vienna 2003,
ISBN 3-902109-15-7.
2003/2 Paola Bongini, The EU Experience in Financial Services
Liberalization: A Model for GATS Negotiation? Vienna 2003, 
ISBN 3-902109-16-5.
2003/3 Jean-Paul Abraham, Introduction by David T. Llewellyn,
Monetary and Financial Thinking in Europe – Evidence from Four
Decades of SUERF, Vienna 2003, ISBN 3-902109-17-3.
2003/4 Securing Financial Stability: Problems and Prospects for New EU
Members (three papers) Introduction by Morten Balling, Vienna 2003,
ISBN 3-902109-18-1
1) Michael C. Bonello, Stability Oriented Monetary and Prudential
Policies in EU Accession Countries
2) Fabrizio Saccomanni, Ensuring Financial Stability: Global and
European Perspectives
3) Claudia M. Buch, Jörn Kleinert and Peter Zajc, Foreign Bank
Ownership: A Bonus or Threat for Financial Stability?
2003/5 Ralph Süppel, Russia’s Financial Markets Boom, Crisis and
Recovery 1995–2001, Vienna 2003, ISBN 3-902109-19-X
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2004/1 Supervisory Systems, Fiscal Soundness and International Capital
Movement – More Challenges for New EU Members (three papers),
Introduction by Morten Balling, Vienna, 2004, ISBN 3-902109-20-3
1)  Integration of European Supervisory Systems: Harmonisation or
Unification? By Andreas Grünbichler and Patrick Darlap
2) The Relevance of Fiscal Soundness for Monetary Stability, by Sinikka
Salo
3)  How Capital Flows will influence the EU Accession Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, by Leslie Lipschitz, Timothy Lane and
Alex Mourmouras
2004/2 European Monetary and Financial Integration: Evolution and
Prospects (five speeches), Introduction by Eduard H Hochreiter and
David T Llewellyn, Vienna, 2004, ISBN 3-902109-21-1
1) Monetary and Financial Thinking in Europe since the Sixties:
Evidence from the SUERF Colloquia. By Jean-Paul Abraham
2)  Fiscal Discipline in a Monetary Union: Issues for the Euro Area.
By Franco Bruni
3) Financial Globalisation and Financial Market Integration in Europe:
Challenges Ahead for the European System of Central Banks,
by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy
4) How to complete the Integration of the European Financial Market,
by Robert Raymond
5) Optimal Currency Areas and Implementation of Economic Policies,
by Jean-Claude Trichet
2004/3 Northern and Eastern Enlargement of EMU: Do Structural Reforms
Matter? By Andrew Hughes Hallett, Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and
Christian Richter, Vienna, 2004, ISBN 3-902109-22-X
2004/4 Electronic Purses in Euroland: Why do Penetration and Usage Rates
Differ? By Leo van Hove, Vienna, 2004, ISBN 3-902109-23-8
2004/5 From Floating to Monetary Union: The Economic Distance between
Exchange Rate Regimes. By Eduard H. Hochreiter and  Pierre L.
Siklos, Vienna, 2004, ISBN 3-302109-24-6
2004/6 Two Measures in Bankruptcy Efficiency. By Riccardo Brogi and
Paolo Santella, Vienna, 2004, ISBN 3-302109-25-4
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2005/1 Will the Adoption of Basel II Encourage Increased Bank Merger
Activity? Evidence from the United States, by Timothy H. Hannan and
Steven J. Pilloff,V ienna, 2005, ISBN 3-902109-26-2
2005/2 Trends in Competition and Profitability in the Banking Industry:
A Basic Framework, by Jakob A. Bikker and Jaap W.B. Bos, Vienna,
2005, ISBN 3-902109-27-0
2005/3 Banking Mergers and Acquisitions in the EU: Overview, Assessment
and Prospects, by RymA yadi and Georges Pujals, Vienna, 2005,
ISBN 3-902109-28-9
2005/4 Internationalization of Banks: Strategic Patterns and Performance, by
Alfred Slager, Vienna, 2005, ISBN 3-902109-29-7
2005/5 Inflation Targeting and its Effects on Macroeconomic Performance,
by Thórarinn G. Pétursson, Vienna, 2005, ISBN 3-902109-30-0
2006
2006/1 Fiscal Issues in the New EU Member Countries – Prospects and
Challenges, by Helmut Wagner,V ienna, 2006, ISBN 3-902109-31-9
2006/2 Visions about the Future of Banking – by Hans J. Blommestein,
Vienna, 2006, ISBN 3-902109-32-7
2006/3 Measuring Scale Economies in a Heterogeneous Industry: The Case
of European Settlement Institutions, by Patrick van Cayseele and
Christophe Wuyts, Vienna, 2006, ISBN 3-902109-33-5
2006/4 Macroeconomic Adjustment in the New EU Member States, by
Jürgen von Hagen and Iulia Traistaru-Siedschlag, Vienna, 2006, 
ISBN 3-902109-34-3
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